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INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose. 
The purpose of this thesis is to present Henri Bergson's 
theory of knowledge. As one studies Bergson's philosophy he 
is constantly impressed with the sparkling originality of his 
thought, but nowhere is this more importantly illustrated than 
in his conviction that a "theory of knowledge" and a "theory 
of life" are inseparable. The great problems of philosophy 
can only be solved, he believed, by bringing together these 
two inquiries. To lay the foundation for such a synthesis was, 
in fact, the aim of his philosophy. It is the purpose of this 
thesis to seek out and examine whatever is fruitful and what-
ever is false in his attempt. 
Since intuition and concepts constitute the elements of 
all our knowledge, 1 a theory of knowledge will consist in a 
determination of the extent and limits of intellection and in-
tuition. This investigation will be primarily concerned, 
therefore, with Bergson's theory of the intellect and of in-
tuition, and with the way in which they are related to his 
theory of life. 
2. l'iethod. 
The method of this thesis is to follow the gradual devel-
1. See Kant, CPR, B75. 
111. 
opment and systematic formulation of Bergs~n's philos~phy with 
particular reference to a theory of knowledge. At first an 
hist~rical rather than systematic approach was envisioned, with 
Bergson's three earlier books constituting the main subject mat-
ter. However, it soon became apparent that this was an arbi-
trary and artificial mode of approach: the subject matter it-
self rather than its chronology should dictate the method of 
procedure. Therefore, it was later decided to use two of Berg-
son's works as the foundation for the investigation of this 
thesis. These works are: Essai sur lea donnees immediates de 
la conscience (1907), English title, Creative Evolution. Ma-
tiere et memoire. assai sur la relation du corps avec 1 1esprit 
(1896), English title, Matter and !-!emory, the b~ok making up 
the original triad, has been carefully studied, but found to 
bear only incidentally on the subject at hand. The argument 
in Matter and Memory, consisting in a phil~sophical investiga-
tion of the inadequacy of psycholbgical interpretati~ns of mem-
ory, does not fit into the scope and aim of this thesis. How-
ever, the findings and conclusions Bergson arrives at as a re-
sult of this study will be included in the text whenever pos-
sible. 
Bergson's last work, Lea deux sources de la morale et de 
la religion (1935), English title, The Two Sources of l<!orality 
and Heligion, was also read, but considered not relevant to 
the problem at hand, dealing mainly with religion and morality, 
iv. 
rather than e?istemology. 
His two smaller w~rks, however, are used extensively 
throu<:>;hout this t:1esis. They are: Introducti~n a la metaohys-
iaua (1903), English title, An Introduction to Metaphysics, 
and a series of articles and lectures written and given in 
France and other countries between 19~3 and 1923, published 
under the title, The Creative Mind. Two articles in the lat-
t3r work entitled "Philosophical Intuition," and "The Percep-
tion of Change, 11 as well as an autobiographical s~etch of the 
develooment of his thought, have proven particularly helpful 
to the understanding of his philosophy. 
Chapter I of this thesis is based primarily on Time and 
Free Will.1 In this chapter Bergson's concept of conscious-
ness is analyzed, and also his theory of intuition and dura-
tion. It was natural to begin with this, his first work, 
since it was through an investigation of consciousness and 
time that Bergson was led to his later philosophical consid-
erations. 
In Chapter II, Bergson's theory of evolution and its re-
lation to a theory of knowledge is considered. The diverse 
tendencies of the evolutionary movement are followed to deter-
1. English translations have been used exclusively in this 
thesis. There i~ some disadvantage in this, of course, but 
since the writer s grasp of the French langugze is not free, 
it is better to rely on more careful translations than his 
own. In all cases authorized translations have been used, 
and in some works Bergson hims?lf has revised the English, 
thereby decreasing the possibility of misinterpretation 
through translation. 
v. 
mine the :Jrigin ~'tnd nature of intuit i :Jn and intellect. 
Chapter III, the last chapter of exposition, deals v1ith 
the metaphysical conclusi:J~s of Ber.~son' s philosophy. In this 
chapter the relati:Jn of metaphysics to a theory :Jf knowled~e 
is stressed, with the interrelation of the two br:Jusht to 
light. This chapter is, logically, the climax of the thesis. 
The last chapter, Chapter IV, contains a summa.ry and cri t-
ical evaluation of Bergson's philosophy, c:Jncentrating prima-
rily on his theory of knowledEe• nowever, since theory of 
knowledse, theory of evolution, and metaphysics are so exten-
sively diffused and interrelated in Bergson's philosophy, it 
is impossible to touch on :J~e wit~out also coming in contact 
with the other. This chapter draws on the m'?cny expository and 
critical works on Bergson: A Critical Exoosition of Bergson's 
PhilosQohy, by J. Mc!Cellar Stewart (1913); Henri Bergson, by 
Emil C. Wilm (1914); Berp;son 9.nd His Philo2oohy, by J. Alexan-
der Gunn (1920); Bergson and Personal Realiso, by Ralph T. 
Flewelling (1920); and Henri Ber~son, by Jacques Chevalier 
( 1928) • 
3. Orientation. 
Before turning to the main body of the the2is, an orienta-
tion to the development 9nd a i.ms of Bergson's philos:JJl1y :night 
be helpful in understanding it. Since the purpos: of this 
thesis is to present nenri "'ergson's theory of ',:nowledge, which, 
as we said, is esoecially significant in its relation to a 
vi. 
theory of life, it is imoortant to know just why Bergson con-
sidered this ral9.t1on so important. 
And in the introduction to The Cre~.tive Hind, Bergson him-
self tells us how he came to be interested in a theory of knowl-
edge and a theory of life. 'iihat he first noticed <J.bout ,?hilos-
ophy is th?t it 11 l 0.cked precision." Its IU'l.ny cy:ote11s are cut 
too wide for reBlity; they "could apply aqually well to a world 
in which neither plants nor animals have existed, ohly men, and 
in which men oould quite possibly do without eating and drink-
ing ••• where everything might just as easily go backwards and 
be upside down." 1 Consequently, Bergson felt th::.t self-con-
tained systems are an "assemblage of concepti ::ms" so :;dopted, 
and consequently so vast, that they might contain, aside from 
the rer1l, "all that is possible and even Lr.,?osc.ible." And so 
he decided that the only explanation of phenomena that he would 
accept as sa.tisfactory "is one wrlich fits tightly to its object, 
with no space between them, no crevice in wi1ich any other ex-
planation might equally well be lodged; :me w'lich fits the ob-
ject only and to which alone the object lends 1 tseif ."2 He 
felt that scientific explanations were of such a ~ind, but that 
metaphysical explanations were not. 
There was one metaphysical theory, however, which seemed 
to be an exception, and that was Spencer's theory of cosmic 
evolution. But when he began studying Spencer's philosophy he 
1. Bergson, CM, 9. (Hereafter, all refarences will De to B3rg-
son unless otherwise noted.) 
2. CM, 9. 
v11. 
found certain weacmesses that led him to analyz,e the c:mcept 
of time. And here, he says, a surprise awaited him: he was 
"very much struck to see how real time, which plays the lead-
ing part in any philosophy of evolution, eludes mathematical 
treatment."1 The line measured in mathematics is immobile, 
ti~e is mobility; the line is made, comolete, while time is 
happening, and even more than that, "causes everything to 
happen."2 The measuring of time never deals with time as 
duration; what is counted is only a certain number of extrem-
ities of intervals, or moments--in short, virtual halts in 
time. But this duration that eludes mathematics, and also 
science, is, a.ccordiog to Bergson, what one "feels and lives." 
Suppose ::me tried to find out v:hat it is--"how WQ:ld duration 
appear to a consciousness which desired only to see it with-
out measuring it, and grasp it without stopping it? 11 3 This 
was the question that Bergson put to himsalf. 
Such being the question, he delved deep into the domain 
of the inner life, which until then hctd held little interest 
for him. There he "quickly spotted tha inadequacy of tha as-
sociationist concapt:on of the mind ••• the result of an arti-
ficial re-grouping ::>f conscious life."4 A l:mg series of re-
flections and analyses led him to brush aside all such associ-
ationist conceptions, until finally, he believed he ha.d found 
"pure, unadulterated innar continuity (duration), continuity· 
l. CM, 10. 
2. CM, ll. 
3. Cl-1, 12. 
4. CM, 12. 
vi11. 
which was neither unity n::>r multi-;Jlicity, and w':Jich did not 
ul fit into any ::>f our categories of thought. 
From the results ::>f the above considerations Bergson was 
convinced that our intelligence "rules out real time," or 
"masks duration" because the goal of our understanding demands 
it. "Metaphysics dates from the days when Zeno of Elea point-
ed out the inherent contradictions of m::>vement and change, as 
::>ur inte.llect represents them." 2 It was because of these con-
tr9.dictions th9.t metaphysics was led to see:: the reelity of 
things above time., beyo:1d what moves and what changes, and con-
sequently outside what our senses and consciousness perceive. 
"As a result it could be :1othing but a more or less ?,rtificial 
arrangement of conce)ts, a hypothetic9.l constructi:m, n3 It 
claimed to go beyond experience, but in reality it was only 
able to "substitute for it a fixed extract desiccated and emp-
ty, a system of abstrs.ct general ideas, drawn fr::Jm that very 
experience, or rather from its most superficial st:rn +,a. " 4 But 
Bergson su:;gests that if we could detach ourselves from t'::.is 
strata many ::>f the "great insoluble problems" would remain at-
tached to the ::Juter shell. Metaphysics ;;::Juld tt.en bec::Jme ex-
perience itself; and duration would be "reve9.led as it really 
is,--increg_sing creation, the uninterrupted up-sure:e of novelty."5 
Such conclusions as to the nature ::Jf dur9.tion, and the 
limitations of the intellect, led Bergson "to raise intuition 
1. C:t-1, 12. 
2. Cl-1, 16. 
3· CM, 17. 
4, CM, 17. 
5. m1, 17. 
lX, 
to the level of a philosophical method ."1 11 Such a :net hod would 
not embr3-ce in a single sweep the totality of t~inq;s; but for 
each thing it would give an explanation which would fit it ex-
actly, and it alone."2 
But Bergson was not content to stop with just describing 
the method. He was also interested in seeing how the differ-
ence ~oetween intuition and intellect could be explained in terms 
of the evolution of life. He believed that the evoluti:m of 
life, incomplete as it yet is, has alr:;ady revesled how the 
intellect had been formed.3 And bac3.use he believed that in-
tellection and intuition are two meth::>ds of knowing which have 
been evolved in the c::>urse of evolution, he felt th~t the lim-
it and extent of their function c::>uld only be correctly eval-
uated when they were considered in ralat~on to the movement 
which produced them. This is the basis ::>f 01is st'J.tenent that 
"a theory of knov1ledp:e and a tne::>ry of life seem to us insep-
arable."4 He believed that any "theory of life" which has not 
been accompanied by a criticism of kn::>wledge has been ::>bliged 
to represent life in the accepted categories of the understand-
ing, thereby misinterpreting it. And ::>n the other hand, a 
"theory of kn::>wladge" which does not view the intellect as a 
product of the evolution of life, cannot taQCh us how the frames 
of knov1ledge have '::Jean originated or how they are constructed .5 
But together, "they may solve by a method more sura, brought 
1. CN, 33 • 
2. Cl'-1, 35. 
3. See CE, xix. 
4 • CE, xxii i. 
5. See CE, 
xx1 ii, xxiv. 
x. 
nearer to experience, the great problems that philosophy poses." 1 
We are thus fortun9te in having so clear a descripti:m, 
by Bergson himself, of the devel oo.nent of his th:JUght, of the 
kind of philos::r;:>hy he hoped to establish, and of tho. method on 
which it is to be based. 
l. CE, xxiv. 
xi. 
CHAPTER I 
INTUITION AND DURATION 
There has often occurred, early in the thought of cer-
tain great men, a particular insight so central to their think-
ing that all later development was a verification and systema-
tization of this insight. Such an insight, Einstein, in his 
autobiographical notes, 1 says occurred to hi~ at the age of six-
teen when he had "already hit upon a paradox" that contained the 
germ of his special relativity theory. And it was also a para-
dox, though not a similar one, that led Bergson to his insight 
into what he considered to te the true nature of time. This in-
sight--~hich he called the intuition of duration--was the core 
of Bergson's philosophy. This was his most original contribution 
and the one that has had the greatest influence on later thought. 2 
The purpose of this chapter will be to explain Bergson's 
method of intuition and the relation of intuition to time. 
Since Bergson conceived of intuition as the method by which one 
can appreciate real time, or duration, a study of intuition 
must precede that of duration. Then on the basis of this study 
a new conception of time and change will be advanced. 
1. Bergson's Method of Intuition. 
Bergson's philosophy is essentially a method.3 It is a 
1. Einstein, Art.(l949), 53. 
2. See Goudge's Intro. to Bergson's ITM. 
3· See Stewart, CEBP, Intro. 
.L. 
method whereby we may grasp internally and sympathetically the 
heart of reality. This method is called intuition and the 
term should be familiar through its historical usage by Plato, 
Spinoza, and Kant.l But it is Bergson's unique use of intuition 
that marks him an original thinker. His method is intended to 
invert the whole process of philosophizing. This C'>n be illus-
trated best by contrasting his use of intuiti~n with Plato's. 
When one reads Plato's "theory of the line" he has the 
delightful sensation of being gently lifted up and carried 
through higher realms of existence. At each successive realm 
it is as if a veil hiding some aspect of reality were removed 
from our sight until finally all of reality becomes clear in 
one immediate vision. This ascent is away from the world of 
sense. In the lowest realm one sees in the dim light only the 
hazy images and shadows of things, so our thoughts are carried 
1. This is not to imply, however, that all four methods of in-
tuition are the same. Nevertheless, there is a common element 
in anyone's use of intuition: this is the immedia.cy and the 
non-deducibility of its content. 
Bergson, Spinoza, and Plato would agree that through intui-
tion we come into immediate contact with reality. Kant would 
assart, however, that our intuition never penetrates beyond 
the phenomenal world: we have no "metaphysical intuition." 
Kant and Spinoza would agree th:'.t the contents of intuition 
either are, or can be made intellectual. Bergson, however, 
would deny that the contents of intuition can be reconstruct-
ed by the intellect--at least, not without altering and fals-
ifying it. 
Bergson's method of intuitiJn differs from that of Plato, 
Schelling, and Schopenhauer in tha.t theirs was an immediate 
search for the eternal and his is a way of finding "true dur-
ation." 
Thus Bergson's method of intuition differs either in form 
or content from that of any other. 
2. 
away by imagination. But as we are lifted higher the light 
becomes brighter and the objects themselves oacoma visible. 
At first the very clarity of this world holds our minds in 
fixed belief. But as we pass on, our thoughts become detach-
ad and they begin to dwell on the moving harmony of the ob-
jects, until finally, our thinking passes from the objects 
to the geometrical order itself. In their winged flight our 
thoughts have freed t\1emselves fro;n all external attachment 
and are now ready to lift themselves up to the highest realm. 
Here there is no movement; all is an eternal calm. In one 
single intuition we grasp the fixed and eternal forms. All 
has become intelligible. 
One could hardly re;nain unimpressed by such a vision, and, 
in fact, Bergson has not. But the vision of Plato only ex-
presses half the truth. There is another half that Bergson 
wishes to stress. 
Bergson seas the whole of ancient philosophy beginning 
with Plato and culminating in Plotinus as the develooment of 
one fundamental principle: "There is mora in the im!llutable 
than in the moving, and we pass from the stable to the un-
stable by a mere diminution."1 This, according to Bergson, 
was the great delusion of ancient thought. And since our senses 
reveal a changing world, thought turned away from sensa per-
1. ITM, 53. 
3. 
caption and 
the metaphysician worked therefore a priori on 
concepts already fixed in language, as if, de-
scended from heaven, they revealed a supra-sen-
sible reality to the mind! Thus was born the 
Platonic theary of ideas. 
Concepts which should have been used to extend and complete 
perception were made into a reality sufficient in themselves. 
But it remained for Kant to show that these concepts, by 
themselves, cannot reveal metaphysical reality; only a super-
iJr intuition, that is, a perception of metaphysical reality 
itself would serve as the basis for a metaph:,sics. Only, hav-
ing proved that intuition alone would be capable of giving us 
a metaphysics, Kant denied that s~ch an intuition was possible. 
Since, however, such a type of intuition, intel-
lectual intuition, forms no part whatever of our 
faculty of knowledge, it follows that the employ-
ment of the cate~ories can never be ext~nded fur-
ther than to the objects of experience. 
But though knowledge of metaphysical reality is impossible, 
scientific knowledge is a fact and "the apodeictic certainty 
of all geometrical propositions"3 led Kant to view science as 
a universal mathematic. This universal mathematic is wh~t 
the world of Ideas becomes when we suppose th?.t the Idea con-
sists of a relation or a law and not of a separate immutable 
entity. So Kant, though denying the existence of a Platonic 
realm of forms, insists th3t our intellects are incapable of 
1. CI>!, 53-54 • 3. Kant, CPR, A24. 
2. Kant, CPR, A252. 
'+ • 
anything but Platonizing--that is, in determining all possible 
existence by the laws of thought. 
Briefly, the whole Critique of Pure Reason 
ends in establishing that Platonism, il-
legitimate if Ideas ,are things, becomes 
legitims.te if Ideas are relations, and that 
the ready-made idea, once brought down in 
this way from heaven to earth, is in fact, 
as Plato held, the co~on basis elike of 
thought and of nature. 
For the ancient 9hilosopher, therefore, the intel-
ligible world was situated outside and asove the one our 
senses perceive: our faculties of perception showed us 
only shadows projected in time and space by immutable and 
eternal Forms. Philosophy began, according to Bergson, 
on the road it has since travelled, the road leading to a 
"suprasensible" world: henceforth, one was to ex9lain t<1ings 
with pure ideas.2 It is true that for the moderns these 
essences are constitutive of sensible things in themselves; 
they are veritable substances, of which phenomena are only 
the caused appearances. But both the ancients and the 
moderns are agreed in desiring a substitution of the concept 
for the percept. They all appeal from the insufficiency of 
our senses to the f~culties of the mind no longer perceptive; 
that is, to the functions of abstraction, generalization, and 
reasoning. 
1. ITM, 57-58. 
2. In The <j:,uest for Certainty, Dewey maintains a similar posi-
tion as to the original aims of philosophy: the road travelled 
by philosophy has been prejudiced by the "classical" search 
for "antecedent reality" (see Q/C, 29-30). 
~. 
But it is this very process of abstraction and con-
ceptualizing that Bergson wishes to invert. It is this, 
according to Bergson, that has given rise to the conflict 
of systems. By this process we can never grasp reality in 
an "absolute" sense.3 Our thoughts move around it and never 
enter in; they can only grasp the static, the spatial, the 
unchanging. But we sh~ll see that reality for Bergson is 
qualitative, creative, and flowing. To experience reality 
we must descend from the realm of abstract concepts and re-
enter the world of perceptual experience. "Conceiving is 
a makeshift when percepti::m is not granted us, and re"l.soning 
is done in order to fill up the gaps of perception or to ex-
tend its scope."2 
Suppose th1t instead of trying to rise above our 
perception of things we were to plunge into it 
for the purpose of deepening and widening it. 
Suppose that we were to insert our will into it, 
and that this will, expanding, were to expand 
our vision of things. We should obtain this time 
a philosophy where nothing in the data of the 
senses or the consciousness would be sacrificed.3 
In this way, Bergson hopes to grasp reality from within 
and to obtain a knowledge of things which is complete. 
1. Bergson uses the term "absolute" rather ambiguously. In 
An Introduction to Metaohysics he speaks of an Absolute knowl-
edge of things, meaning an "internal" or "sympathetic" grasp 
of the thing (see ITM, 21). In Cree.tive Evolution he says: 
"In the absolute we live and move and have our being" (CE, 199). 
It is not clear just what he does mean by this, since the 
phrase only occurs once and without elaboration. 
2. CM, 155. 3. CM, 158. 
6. 
This is the purpose of intuition. 
By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual 
s~pathi by which one places oneself within an 
o~ectn order to coincide with what1is unique in it and consequently inexpressible. 
This experience, When it has to do with material objects, 
is called exterior perception, and when it has to do with 
the mind, intuition.2 Thus, intuition would not embrace 
in a single sweep the totality of things (as in the philos-
ophy of Plato), but for each thing it would give an explana-
tion which would fit it exactly, and it alone. The question 
is, then, do we have such an intuition? 
2. Intuition of Duration. 
There is one intuition at least which we all have, ac-
cording to Bergson, and that is the inner awareness of our 
own personality in its flow through time--our self which en-
dures. "We may sympathize intellectually with nothing else, 
but we certainly sympathize with our own selves."3 What, 
then, do we find when we direct our attention inward to con-
template ourselves? 
First, we perceive, as a "orust solidified on the sur-
face,"4 all the perceptions whioh come to us from the mate-
1. ITM, 23. 
2. See •·eM, 57. Bergson is not consistent in th1s distinc-
tion, however. He also uses intuition as a more intimate 
or "absolute" kind of perception, meaning that the "in-
ternal" nature of the thing 1s sympathetically grasped by 
intuition. He likens intuition to aesthetic perception 
(see ITM, 32). 
3· CE, 24. 
4. ITM, 25. 
7. 
rial world. "These perceptions are clear, distinct, jux-
taposed or juxtaposable one with another: they tend to 
1 group themselves into objects." Then there are the mem-
ories Which more or less adhere to these perceptions and 
Which serve to interpret them. These memories, detached, 
as it were, from the depth of our personalities, have been 
drawn to the surface by the perceptions which resemble 
them; they rest on the surface of our minds without being 
absolutely ourselves. Many float on the surface, "like 
dead leaves on the water of a pond." And lastly, we feel 
the stir or tendencies and motor habits--"a crowd of vir-
tual actions, more or less firmly bound to these percep-
tions and memories." 2 All these clearly defined elements 
appear more distinct from us, the more distinct they are 
from each other. "Radiating, as they do, from within out-
wards, they form, collectively, the surface of a sphere 
which tends to grow larger and lose itself in the exterior 
world. 113 This is how our conscious experience becomes 
spatialized, by .the natural detension or relaxation of con-
sciousness. But, if we draw ourselves in from the periphery 
towards the center, if we search in the depth or our beings 
that which is most uniformly, most constantly, and most en-
1. ITM, 25. 
2. ITM, 25. 
3. ITM, 25• 
8. 
duringly ourselves, we find, according to Bergson, some-
thing altogether different. 
Beneath those "sharply cut crystals 11 and "frozen sur-
face," we find a continuous flux which is not comparable to 
any other. 11There is a succession of states, each of which 
announces that which follows and contains that which pre-
1 
cedes it." In reality, no one of them begins or ends, but 
all extend into each other. It is this inner flux that 
Bergson calls duration: 
Inner duration is the continuous life of a mem-
ory which prolongs the past into the present, 
the present either containing within it in a 
distinct form the ceaselessly growing image of 
the past, or, more probably, showing by its 
continual change of quality the heavier and still 
heavier load we drag behind us as we grow older. 
Without this survival of the past into the present 2 there would be no duration, but only instantaneity. 
This duration is the form Which the succession of our 
conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when 
it refrains from separating its present state from its for-
mer states, but forms both the past and the present states 
into one organic whole--like the notes of a tune, melting 
into one another. In a word, pure duration is "but a suc-
cession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate 
one another, without any tendency to externalize themselves 
in relation to one another, without any affiliation with 
number."3 
1. ITM, 25. 
2. ITM, 40. 
3• TFW, lo4. 
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So beneath the crust of our outer consciousness we 
find deep within us a pure duration Whose heterogeneous 
moments permeate one another; a duration whose states are 
not distinct, but melt into one another and form one or-
ganic Whole: a duration that is continuous creative 
growth. It is a growing duration because our conscious-
ness s~lls with all the past it carries with it. In 
Matter and Memory Bergson tries to prove that memory can-
not be explained in terms of brain cells or the associa-
tion of nerve processes, but is purely a function of 
spirit or consciousness.1 It is the belief of Bergson 
that all of our past is retained in our pure spirituality 
and that our brain merely serves to attach our useful 
memories to our present conscious states. Thus our memory 
conveys something of the past into the present and our 
mental state, as it advances along the road of time, is 
continually swelling with the duration which it accumu-
lates: "it goes on increasing---rolling upon itself, as a 
snowball on the snow."2 
It is this inner duration that we reach by intuition: 
Intuition, bound up to a duration which is 
growth, perceives in it an uninterrupted con-
tinuity of unforeseeable novelty, it sees, it 
knows that the mind draws from itself more 
that it has, that spirituality consists in just that, and that reality, impregnated with 
spirit, is creation.3 
1. See MM, 320. 3· CM, 39. 
2. CE, 2. 
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This duration, then, is the reality reached by intuition. 
This is the other half of that truth which Plato neglected, 
and that Bergson wanted to stress. But here one may ask, 
What is the relation of this inner duration to our outer 
conscious states? How can there be an outer crust and an 
inner flux? Does there exist in the inner consciousness a 
self distinct from the one that is normally experiencd? 
3. The Two Aspects of the Self. 
The answer to these questions Bergson has carefully 
formulated. There is but one self, but there are two as-
pects of this self. Our conscious life displays these two 
aspects according as we perceive it directly or by refrac-
tion through space. And since direct perception, or in-
tuition, has already been discussed, the other aspect will 
be considered. 
It is found that "in proportion as we get away from 
the deeper strata of the self, our conscious states tend 
more and more to assume the form of a numerical multiplic-
ity, and to spread out in a homogeneous epace. 111 In doing 
this, our self comes in contact with the external world at 
its surface; our successive sensations, although dissolving 
into one another, retain something of the mutual external-
ity which belong to their objective causes; and so our 
1. TFW, 92• 
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superficial psychic life comes to be pictured as set out 
in a homogeneous medium. This homogeneous medium, Which 
is space, is not derived from our sensations. Bergson 
agrees with Kant both "in endowing space with an existence 
independent of its content, 111and in denying it an independ-
ent reality. In the first chapter of Time and Free Will 
Bergson had endeavored to prove that sensations and psychic 
2 
states are qualitative and not quantitative. If this is 
true, then inextensive sensations cannot ~ive rise to space 
merely by their coexistence: "there must be an act of the 
mind which takes them all at the same time and sets them in 
juxtaposition."' If we seek to characterize this act, we 
see that it consists essentially in the conception of an 
empty homogeneous medium. Space, for Bergson, 
is what enables us to distinguish a number of 
identical and simultaneous sensations from one 
another; it is thus a principle of differentia-
tion other than that of qualitative differentia-
tion, ant consequently it is a reality with no 
quality. 
If someone suggests that simultaneous sensations are 
never identical, and that, because of the diversity of the 
organic elements which they affect, there are no two points 
1. TFW, 92. 
2. This is a highly technical 
can competently evaluate. 
consistent and seems to be 
Lotze, Bain, and Wundt. 
3. TFW, 94. 
4. TFW, 95. 
problem which only the eXPert 
The argument is certainly 
supported by the theories of 
12. 
of a homogenous surface Which make the same impression on 
the sight or the touch, then it is answered, that "just 
because we afterwards interpret this difference or quality 
in the sense of a difference of situation, it follows that 
we must have a clear idea of a homogeneous medium. 111 The 
more one insists on the difference between the impressions 
made on our retina by two points of a homogeneous surface, 
the more must one make room for the activity of the mind, 
which perceives under the form of extensive homogeneity 
What is given it as qualitative heterogeneity. Thus we 
have to do with two different kinds of reality, the one 
heterogeneous, that of sensible qualities, the other homo-
geneous, namely space. This latter, according to Bergson, 
enables us to use clean cut distinctions, to count, to ab-
stract, and perhaps also to speak. 
This can be especially illustrated in our idea of 
number. The idea of number always implies the simple in-
tuition of parts absolutely alike, which parts must be in 
space. Number is a unity ( 2 4 8 ), the unification of 
Which is due to a simple act of the mind. Whenever we 
think of these units separately, we look upon them as in-
divisible since we are intent upon their unity alone. 
But as soon as we put the number aside to pass to the next, 
we objectify it, and thereby make it into a thing, that is, 
1. TFW, 95. 
a multiplicity. This multiplicity is then subject to in-
finite divisibility. Now, the very possibility or dividing 
a unity into as many parts as we like, shows that we regard 
it as extended. Uhits are therefore parts or space, "and 
space is, accordingly, the material with which the mind 
1 builds up number, the medium in which the mind places it." 
Bergson finds other indications of this in the concept 
of the impenetrability of matter. We cannot imagine one 
body penetrating another without picturing pores or spaces 
by Which this penetration is possible. But if impenetra-
bility were really a quality of matter, then it should be 
no harder to imagine the penetrability of matter than the 
blending of colors or feelings. In reality, impentrability 
is not a physical but a logical necessity which attaches to 
the proposition: "Two bodies cannot occupy the same place 
at the same time." But does not this amount to recognizing 
that the very idea of number 2, or, more generally, of any 
number Whatever, involves the idea of juxtaposition in 
space? If this is true, then "to assert the impenetrability 
of matter is simply to recognize the inter-connection be-
tween the notions of number and space; it is to state a 
property of number rather than of matter." 2 
But number is not the only notion that seems to be 
1. TFW. 84. 
2. TFW, 89. 
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baaed on the spatial form of our consciousness. Time, 
as ordinarily conceived, is also a homogeneous medium 
identical with space. For, with the ticking of a clock, 
or the numerical sounding of the bella we count auccessive 
discrete intervals and string them along a homogeneous 
line. Each is supposed to have its own separate beginning 
and ending. Duration, according to this view, is composed 
of homogeneous units set side by side. Time marches on ac-
cording to a definite cadence, never changing; each succes-
sive step equals the one before. But what is space, but a 
homogeneous medium, each part of which can be excnanged 
with any other? But if homogeneity consists in the absence 
of every quality, it is hard to see how two forms of the 
homogeneous could be distinguished from one another. "If 
then, one of those two supposed forme of the homogeneous, 
namely time and space, is derived from the other, we can 
surmise a priori that the idea of space is the fundamental 
datum."1 
And When we analyze our conscious states we find the 
same thing: we generally think of a homogeneous medium in 
which our conscious states are ranged alongside one another 
as in space, so as to form a discrete multiplicity. It is 
1• TFW, 99. 
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this passage of conscious states that we ordinarily 
speak of as time. If time, as our reflective conscious-
ness represents it, is a medium in which our conscious 
states form a discrete series capable of being counted, 
and if, as we have already seen, our conception of number 
ends in spreading out in space everything which can be 
directly counted, it is to be presumed that time, under-
stood in the sense of a medium in which we make dietinc-
tiona and count, is nothing but space. It is certain 
that time, as thus conceived, is not duration. According 
to this view, all our experience takes place at instants--
instants that are "not spread" at all. These instants 
have the same relation to time that a point has to space. 
As a point has no magnitude, so an instant has no duration--
it is succeeded by another instant, and that by another, 
and so on. The world at one instant would be completely 
wiped out by the world as it is at the next instant. There 
would be no connection between the two, no real duration; 
there would only be substitution of one instant for another. 
It is "this statement of time in terms of separate instants 
that Bergson calls a 'spatial statement of time• 111 
The only conclusion, then, is that a spatial form is 
the fundamental characteristic of our superficial conscious 
states. 2 The contents of our consciousness are spread out 
1. Mead, MTNC, 298. 
2. This does not imply of course that our consciousness is 
itself spatial, but only that its contents take on a 
spatial form. 
10. 
in space and take on a numerical multiplicity in a time 
that is, essentially, no different from space. It may be 
wondered Why this point is labored since this is the common 
sense view supported by our daily experience. This is true, 
but Bergson wishes clearly to distinguish this outer spa-
tialized aspect of our consciousness (or self, or ego), 
from the inner flow of true duration: 
We should therefore distinguish two forms of 
multiplicity, two very different ways of re-
garding duration, two aspectsof conscious life, 
Below homogeneous duration, which is the ex-
tensive symbol of true duration, a close psycho-
logical analysis distinguishes a duration whose 
heterogeneous moments permeate one another: be-
low the numerical multiplicity of conscious 
states, a qualitative multiplicity; below the 
self with well-defined states, a self in which 
succeeding each other means melting into one 1 another another and forming an organic whole. 
Generally, we are content with the first form of the 
self i.e., with the shadow of the self projected into homo-
geneous space. This form of a homogeneous space is a step 
towards social life. It is through this form that we are 
able to picture an external world quite distinct from our-
selves, and common to all conscious beings. Bergson be-
lieves that our tendency to form a clear picture of this 
externality of things and the homogeneity of their medium 
is the same as the impulse which leads us to live in common 
and to speak. 
1. TF'If, 128. 
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In proportion as the conditions of social life 
are more completely realised, the current which 
carries our conscious states from within outward 
is strengthened; little by little these states 
are made into objects or things ••• an inner life 
with well distinguished moments and with clearly 
characterized states will inswer better the re-
quirements of social life. 
Because this self is eo much better adapted to the re-
quirements of social life in general and language in par-
ticular, consciousness prefers it, and gradually loses 
sight of the fundamental self. But it must always be re-
membered that there are not two distinct selves; 
it is the same self which perceives distinct 
states at first, and Which, by afterwards con-
centrating its attention, will see these states 
melt into one another like the crystals of a 
snow-flake when touched for some time with the 
finger.2 
Thus the nature of the two aspects of the self is 
clearly defined by Bergson. The fundamental characteristic 
of our superficial conscious states is that they tend to 
spread out in a form of homogeneous space. Each state ap-
pears as a separate snapshot, maintaining a more or less 
distinct frame from the next. Time is measured by counting 
the number of slides as they appear in consciousness. 
But beneath this spatialized aspect of consciousness, 
there is found another aspect whose fundamental characteris-
1. TFW, 1'38-1'39. 
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tic is time. The time disclosed here, however, is not 
just a succession of (seemingly) separate states, but a 
time that is the very life of consciousness. In this 
aspect no spatialized states are found, but a continuous 
interpenetrating flow of heterogeneous kaleidoscopic ,sen-
sations. It is not a consciousness pictured, but a con-
sciousness felt. As such, each feeling merges into the 
next, tinging that with the color of its past sensation. 
Actually, there are no really past sensations, since each 
sensation blends into and is carried along by the future 
stream of feeling. 
This aspect of consciousness is a continual flow 
Whose underlying current is time. It is the private sen-
tient basis of our spatially socialized consciousness. 
From this amorphous base of sense feeling a superficial 
consciousness arises in which these sensations are cry-
stallized into patterns of objects. It is these patterns 
of objects, When such patterns are not the result of an 
arbitrary subjective order, that we call the outer world. 
It is due to the stability and permanence of this outer 
world that we are able to live a social life, If there 
were not this universal and abiding element in our con-
scious experience there could be no common basis for a 
community of experience or a universe of discourse. All 
would be in such a flux that no knowledge would be pos-
19. 
sible. Since man would be an integral part of this flux, 
his knowledge would be changing with every passing moment, 
and all knowledge would be relative to the particular posi-
tion and time of the individual within this flux. It is 
the awareness of this aspect of the Heraclitean view of 
reality as continual flux, that led Protagoras to his "man 
is the measure" theory. For if the world is in a continual 
flux, if man could never have two similar experiences, just 
as he cannot "step twice in the same rivers," then indeed, 
each man would be the measure of all things: "of existing 
things that they are, and of non-existing things that they 
are not." 
But here there arises the question: How is our con-
sciousness related to the outer world in which we see both 
permanence and change? What is to be considered the more 
fundamental, the changing--which is the more fundamental 
aspect of our self--or the permanent--Which is more charac-
teristic of our superficial conscious states? 
4. The Perception of Change and Mobility. 
Thus the problem of the nature of change and mobility 
has arisen--though not for the first time in history. Ac-
cording to Bergson, "metaphysics, as a matter of fact, was 
born of the arguments of Zeno of Elea on the subject of 
20. 
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change and movement." It was Zeno who, by drawing atten-
tion to the absurdity of what he called movement and change, 
led the philosophers--Plato first and foremost as we have 
seen--to seek the true and coherent reality above the chang-
ing, in a realm of immutable eternal Forms. And Kant, be-
lieving that our senses and consciousness are exerted in a 
phenomenal time, was led to believe that a metaphysics could 
be constituted only through a superior intuition--an intui-
tion Which we do not have. 
Why did Kant believe such a metaphysical intuition 1m-
possible? Precisely because he pictured a vision of reality 
that Plato and Plot1nus had imagined, as all those who have 
appealed to metaphysical intuition have imagined it. They 
all believed in a faculty of knowing Which would differ from 
consciousness as well as from the senses, which would even 
be oriented in the opposite direction. They believed this 
because they imagined that our senses and consciousness, as 
they function in every-day life, enable us to grasp movement 
directly. They believed that we actually perceive, by our 
senses and consciousness, the change that takes place in 
things and in ourselves. And since the usual reflection on 
our perception of change results in insoluble difficulties, 
they concluded that contradiction was inherent in change it-
self and that in order to avoid this contradiction one had 
1 •. OM, 164-165. 
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to get out of the sphere of change and lift one self above 
Time. 1 Such is the position taken by the metaphysician as 
well as by those who, along with Kant, deny the possibility 
of metaphysics.2 
But Bergson would like to prove that what Zeno first, 
and then metaphysicians in 8eneral, took for movement and 
change was really neither one: "that of chane;e they retained 
what does not change, and of movement what does not move;"3 
that what they took for an immediate and complete perception 
of m:Jvement and change was in r~ality "a crystallization of 
this perception, a solidification with an eye to practic~."4 
In order to avoid such contradictions as those 
which Zeno pointed out and to separate our 
everyday knowledge from the relativity to which 
Kant considered it condemned, we should not have 
to get outside of time (we are already outside 
of it), we should not have to free ourselves of 
change (we are already only too free of it); on 
the contrary, what we should have to do is to 
grasp change and duration in their original 
mobility.5 
Thus, according to Bergson, in order to understand mo-
bility and change, we must return to the direct perception 
of change and in::>bility: "we shgll think of all cholllge, all 
6 
movement, as baing absolutely indivisible." The paradoxes 
of Zeno would never have occurrea if ID:Jvement had been tak,en 
1. See Bradley, AR, V, for a modern exposition :;,f this view. 
2. See CM, 165-166. 5. CM, 167. 
3. CM, 166. 6. CM, 168. 
4. CM, 166. 
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as continuous, and not as a series of divisible acts. 
Achilles would be sentenced to an eternal pursuit of the 
tortoise, if left to the judgment of ordinary speculation, 
when everyone knows, as a point or fact, that Achilles 
would easily overtake and pass the tortoise. Why this 
discrepancy between speculation and matter of fact? The 
reason, according to Bergson, 1s that the movement of 
Achilles is one continuous act, not a separate series of 
acts cutting 1n half the distance between him and the tor-
toise. As continuous, movement can never be juxtaposed 
on the immobile. It is this attempt that led to Zeno's 
paradoxes.1 Because a movement generally begins and ends 
at a definite point, and because the distance travelled 
can be represented by a line, this is not to say that the 
trajectory itself is the movement. Such a line is in-
finitely divisible, but the movement is not. 
The same thing is encountered when the passage of an 
object is observed. There is a tendency to fix attention 
on different positions along the passage, unconsciously 
reducing the passage to a succession or positions. But 
how could an object be in one position and still be mobile? 
How could something moving coincide with something not 
moving? The answer Bergson gives is that it could not. 
It "passes through," or in other terms it Mcould be there," 
but this poss1b111ty would only be fulfilled 1f 1t stop-
ped; but 1f it stopped, then 1t would no longer be mobile. 
The Eleat1cs tried to solve such enigmas by reducing 
all change to mere 1llus1on. But Bergson takes a Heracl1-
t1an view and states that 
movement 1s reality itself, and what we call 
1mmob111ty 1s a certain state of things 
analogous to that produced when two trains 
move at the same sp!ed, 1n the same direction, 
on parallel tracks. 
A traveller on such a train would believe the two trains 
to be 1mmob1le, when actually they might be moving at a 
tremendous speed. Though a situation of this kind 1s ex-
ceptional, Bergson believes our whole view of the mobile 
and 1mmob1le 1s of such a nature. "Immobility being the 
prerequisite of our action, we set 1t up as a reality, we 
make of 1t an absolute, and we see 1n movement something 
which 1s super1mposed." 2 But movement for Bergson, "1f 
not everything, is noth1ng."3 If we begin with the 1m-
mobile, then we can never get the mobile. 
And the conclusion 1s not only true for movement, 
but 1s also true for change. All change for Bergson 1s 
an 1nd1v1s1ble change. For example, l~t us take an object 
that changes color. Here one would suppose that the chan~e 
consists 1n a series of shades which do not change them-
24 
selves, but Which constitute the change. Yet a color, if 
it has any objective existence at all, "is an infinitely 
rapid oscillation," which is change. And even the 
perception we have of it, to the extent that 
it is subjective, is only an isolated, ab-
stract aspect of the general state of our 
person, and this state as a whole is con-
stantly changing and causing this so-called 
invariafle perception to participate in its 
change. 
Thus, color outside of us is mobility itself, and, 
as was learned in the last section of this chapter, the 
affective aspect of our consciousness is also continuous 
mobility. So the conclusion Bergson arrives at is that 
the Whole mechanism of our perception of 
things ••• has been regulated in such a way 
as to bring about, between the external and 
the internal mobility, a s~tuation comparable 
to that of our two trains. 
When two changes, that of the object and that of the sub-
ject, take place under particular conditions, they produce 
the particular appearance which Bergson calls a "state." 
Once in possession of "states," our mind recomposes change 
with them. Thus change, broken up into states, enables us 
to act upon things, and so we become more interested in 
the things than the change, and substitute the former for 
the latter. But this substitution, Bergson believes, is 
the cause of our insoluble metaphysical problems. 
1. ~'CM, 172. 
2. ''OM, 172• 
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Another point that Bergson wishes to establish in 
relation to change, is "that there is underneath the 
changing, no thing which changes: change has no need of 
support.•1 Change is composed of movements, but not of 
an inert or invariable core Which supports the movement: 
"movement does not imply a mobile. 11 2 
This fact is difficult to accept, Bergson believes, 
because our sight, the sense 'par excellence', has already 
developed the habit of separating and selecting the rela-
tively invariable objects from our visual field. These 
objects of our attention or action are then believed to 
change place without changing form, and movement is super-
added to them as an accident. Change is made the result of 
an external force rather than an alteration of the thing 
itself. Thus the sense of sight is an "advance-guard" for 
the sense of touch: it prepares our action upon the external 
world."3 
But Bergson suggests that if we appeal to the sense of 
hearing we may have less difficulty in perceiving movement 
and change as independent realities. 
Let us listen to a melody, allowing ourselves 
to be lulled by it: do we not have the clear 
perception of a movement which is not attached 
to a mobile, of a change without anything 
ohanging?4 
3· OM, 174. 
4 •. 'CM, 174. 
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Isn't this change enough: is it not the thing-in-itself? 
Could one divide it up by a aeries of rests or transform 
it into a series of staccato's and still retain the flow 
or the melody? We have, no doubt, a tendency to divide 
and picture it as a juxtaposition or distinct notes, in-
stead of an uninterrupted continuity of melody. But 
isn't this because we are thinking or the notes rather 
than listening to the music, or picturing a keyboard on 
which someone is playing? Bergson believes that if we did 
not dwell on such spatial images, pure change would remain, 
"sufficient unto itself, in no way divided, in no way at-
tached to a 'thing' which Qhangea."1 
But even in our sense of sight, When we concentrate 
our attention upon it, we perceive that movement does not 
demand a vehicle nor change a substance. "A suggestion of 
this vision of material things already comes to us from 
physical science."2 The more physics progresses the more 
it resolves matter into events moving through space or 
movements dashing back and forth in a constant vibration 
so that mobility is reality itself. All that is left of 
the immobile is a visual image, Which is believed to be 
caused by a series of extremely rapid vibrations. The 
alleged movement or things is in reality only a movement 
of movements. 
1· , .. CM, 174. 
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And a glance into the domain of our inner life re-
veals the same thing. There are no series of distinct 
psychological states and no substantial ego which somehow 
supports them: 
There is simply the continuous melody of our 
inner life,--a melody which is going on and 
will go on, indivisible, from the beginning 
to the end of our conscious existence. Our 
personality is precisely that. 
And so once again we are brought back to true duration: 
"this indivisible continuity of change is precisely what 
constitutes true duration."2 This duration is What has 
always been called time, but it is time experienced as 
indivisible. There is a succession to time, but no dis-
tinction of before and after. It is like a melody which 
is the purest impression of succession that we could pos-
sibly have. It is the very continuity of the melody and 
the impossibility of breaking it up that constitutes its 
real duration. 
5. Summary and Conclusion. 
Thus this chapter is brought to a conclusion. In 
following Bergson's argument it has been found that whether 
it is a question of the internal or the external, of our-
selves or of things, reality is mobility itself. It is 
this reality of pure duration that is reached primarily by 
1• ··OM, 176• 2 •. OM, 176. 
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intuition. It is through the experience of our own inner 
duration and then through the perception of outer change 
and movement that we come to realize that time itself, is 
the reality of the universe. The world exists in, and has 
its being from, time. This unsubstantial, abstract, un-
pictureable concept of time is, indeed, hard to grasp by 
the understanding, but seems to be a concept forced on us 
by philosophers like Bergson, Alexander, and Whitehead 
(perhaps James and Dewey), as well as by the findings of 
contemporary science. 
What has vanished from the field of ultimate 
scientific conceptions is the notion of 
vacuous material existence with passive en-
durance, with primary individual attributes, 
and with accidental adventures. Some features 
of the physical world can be expressed in that 
way. But the concept is useless as in ultimate 
notion in science, and in cosmology. 
The discrete solid particles of Newton's day have been re-
duced to molecules, then atoms, then electrons, then energy 
units; but even energy has too substantial a connotation. 
N~w the term used is fields of force. 2 This activity has 
a structure, but the structure seems to be the law of the 
activity. Also the theory of an expanding universe would 
seem to support Bergson's theory of time, as the discovery 
that mass is a function of motion is consistent with his 
theory of motion. 
We must, therefore, to think time and movement, brush 
1. Whitehead, PR, 471. 2. Einstein and Infeld, 
TEP, Chp. III. 
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~side ~11 such notions as subst~nce, mqttar, immobility, 
etc. Th,se qre merely forms in which our superfici~l 
conscious~ess constructs a \·;orld settins for s::>cial ac-
tivity. But th::>ugh in ttcis w~y we c<Jn think ti:ne aad 
ch~n3e, Bergs::>n is c::>nviccad th9.t we can only experience 
the trua dur9.ti:m of change by either inner or outer 9ar-
ception. Wa experience it inw9.rdly as c::>nsci::>us dura-
tion, and outw~rdly as continuous changa. 
30. 
CHAPTER II 
EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
1. Introduction. 
In the last chapter Bergson's method of intuition 
was described. It was found that intuition for Bergson 
means placing oneself sympathetically within the thing 
to be known: it is knowledge by sympathetic insight rather 
than knowledge by abstraction, conceptualization, or re-
flection. The full implication of this method of know-
ing will be explored. Firat, however, the nature of the 
reality revealed through intuition will be considered. 
In considering the use of intuition, it was found 
that one thing at least is grasped intuitively, and that 
is our own selves. But the self revealed through intuition 
is not the self of our discrete, static, homogeneous con-
scious states. When we draw ourselves inward and let our 
Ego dissolve in the tempo of our conscious life, we find 
a consciousness that is continual, creative, qu~litative 
growth. It is this inner life of our consciousness that 
Bergson calls duration. This duration "is the continuous 
progress of the past which gnaws into the futura and swells 
as it advances."1 Thlei 1B the reality gM.sped by intuition 
1. CE, 4. 
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And outer perception too, it was found, intro-
duces a reality of duration. In the perception of 
outer movement or change, the movement is perceived 
as a single, continuous, completed act. In such per-
ception the paradoxes which are encountered in trying 
to reconstruct change or movement conceptually are 
avoided. And while traditional philosophy has been 
keenly aware of the paradoxes, its conclusion has gen-
1 
erally been the opposite of that or Bergson. Whereas 
Bergson accepts the movement as the real and rejects 
the conceptual account, the traditional view has been 
to trust the conceptual process and condemn as illusory 
(Parmenides) or minimal reality (Plato) the process of 
change itself. This ia Bergson's "Copernican Revolu-
tion" in philoaophy. 
Bergson points out that we must wait for sugar to 
dissolve or ink to dry--the physical process thus match-
ing the duration of our own conscious impatience. "This 
little fact," says Bergson, "is big with meaning." 2 For 
Bergson it signifies that the universe as a whole is an 
enduring process. Only when such processes are isolated, 
he believes, can they be treated as unaffected by time. 
Only then can one proceed as if an experiment could be 
repeated indefinitely without any qualitative change. 
1. Heracl1tus and Hegel are notable exceptions. 
2. CE, 9. 
But When attention is expanded from the isolated unite 
to the universe as a Whole, such phenomena as geological 
changes, creation of nebular systems, and even evidence 
or an expanding universe are found. A view or these 
phenomena must assume that time makes a real difference. 
If these views are true, then the universe must endure, 
and once again this duration "is the continued progress 
of the past which grows into the future and swells as it 
advances." 
So far, however, only the duration of consciousness 
and physical change have been considered. What can be 
said or the biological world, the world of living, grow-
ing, evolving organisms? Do the lives of these organisms 
also endure? What is the nature of the evolutionary proc-
ess? Does that too resemble physical and conscious dura-
tion? 
The purpose of this Chapter, therefore, will be to 
see in what way, if any, the evolution of life can also 
be considered a process or duration. But we shall be con-
cerned with more than the duration or life; an attempt 
will also be made to determine what explanation best fits 
the transformation of life;e.g., mechanism or finalism. 
And finally, the main tendencies taken by the life force 
in its gradual transformation will be followed, with par-
ticular emphasis on the relation of evolution to a theory 
of knowledge. 
2. Organized Bodies and Real Duration. 
When it comes to demonstrating the duration of life, 
far less difficulty should be had than in representing 
either physical or conscious duration. It is a fact forced 
upon all of us, because it is a fact lived rather than ob--
served, that our bodies and the bodies of other organisms 
go through a continual process of change. Each of us grows 
older with every breath, every movement, every moment of 
life. To be born, to grow old, and to die is the brief his-
tory of every organism. 
But what does growing old mean but that time ia gradu-
ally, but continually, leaving its mark on the organism. 
The process of anabolism and catabolism is incessant, but 
a stage is apparently reached when the building up process 
falls behind the tearing down. The cells of the body age 
and wastes accumulate while reconstruction lags behind. 
Retention of the past, continual change, incessant growth,--
these seem to be the characteristics of the living organism. 
And this again is what is meant by duration. So, "like the 
universe as a whole, like each conscious being taken sepa-
rately, the organism which lives is a thing which endures.nl 
1. CE, 15. 
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But how can this life, this duration of the organism 
be represented? It is found that whether we consider the 
most complex organism, the body of man, or the simplest 
one-celled amoeba, the process or +ife is the same. It is 
the same impetus which causes man to develop, to grow larger, 
and to age, that within the tiniest, humblest organism also 
causes these changes. "Life is like a current passing from 
1 germ to germ through the medium of a developed organism." 
So the duration of life is not just continuous within the 
organism itself, but is continuous throughout the organic 
world. 
This is especially represented in the genetic theory 
of '!e~smann, called the "continuity of the germ plasm.•• Ac-
, 
.· 
co~ding to this view the stream of life is passed on through 
the germinal cells alone--the somatic or body cells merely 
providing a temporary environment and a means of transmission 
for the germinal cells.2 Life guarantees its own continua-
tion and evolution through the diversity inherent in its 
nature and the biological urge to reproduce. And though this 
theory in its extreme formfas advocating an exclusive sepa-
ration of the interacting influences of somatic and germinal 
cells is probably false, there seems little doubt that the 
means or germinal reproduction is limited to a few cells, at 
1. CE, 27· 
2. See CE, 26. 
3. See Patrick, ITP. 138-139. 
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least in the higher organisms. 
It is as if the organism itself were only an 
excresence, a bud caused to sprout by the 
former germ endeavoring to continue itself 
in a new germ. The essential thing is the 
continuous progress indefinitely pursued, an 
invisible progress, on Which each visible 
organism rides during the short interval of 
time given it to live.l 
And the more life is pictured as a living current 
or a stream of vitality, 
the more we see that organic evolution re-
sembles the evolution of a consciousness, 
in which the past presses against the pres-
ent and causes the upspringing of a new form 
of consciousness, incommensurable with its 
antecedents.2 
Bergson again asserts that the difficulty in picturing 
life in this manner ia due to the attempt to conceptu-
alize the process. But if we think of some of our own 
organic urges and the way they press against our con-
sciousness we can sympathize momentarily with the life 
force itself. And this force, like the flow of conscious-
ness, is also creative. From past observations one could 
not predict the exact emergence of new biological adapta-
tions any more than the conscious response of man to his 
environment can be exactly predicted. In both oases the 
adaptations vary with the experience of the past which is 
carried into the present. "At every instant, then, evolu-
1. CE, 27. 
2. CE, 27. 
tion must admit of a psychological interpretation which 
is, from our point of view, the best interpretation."1 
3· Radical Mechanism and Radical Finalism. 
There are two ways by which the intellect tries to 
explain away this creativity of life, neither of which 
is acceptable to Bergson. The first is "radical mech-
anism, N and the second is "radical finalism." The in-
tellect feels impelled to such explanations because if 
it admits to the continual emergence of unforseeable 
novelty, then it admits that as an instrument of utility 
it is only adequate to the past, but not the future. The 
novelty of life, as of consciousness, escapes the forms 
and categories of our thought. And again, it is the re-
ality of time as duration which makes this difference. 
When one applies the mechanistic interpretation to 
life, what are the implications? In truth, "radical 
mechanism implies a metaphysic in Which the apparent 
duration of things expresses merely the infirmity of a 
mind that cannot know everything at once. 11 2 It implies 
that all the potential exists at present in the actual 
so that a mind profound enough could deduce from what 
now exists all that could or will exist. But Bergson 
denies this. The novelty of evolution is one which 
1. CE, 51. 
2. CE, 39. 
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transcends the profundity of intellect. 
This mechanistic view also implies that the gears of 
the universe could be shifted into reverse without any op-
position at all. For if all that is possible exists now 
in the actual, then any change is merely a rearranging of 
parts. On this view time really makes no great difference, 
"for time is here deprived of efficacy and if it ~ noth-
ing, it 1.§ nothing."1 But again this is the view that 
Bergson has all along been fighting. Duration is like a 
great wave sweeping everything before it, agai&st which 
nothing could possibly remain immutable. Nor could we push 
back time any more than we can find an elixir of youth. Time 
"is the very 1 stuff 1 of life. "2 
But turning from the mechanistic view to radical final-
ism, just as unacceptable an account is found, and for the 
same reason. "The doctrine of teleology, in its extreme 
form ••• implies that things and beings merely realize a pro-
gramme previously arranged."3 According to this view the 
possible does not exist in the actual, as in mechanism, but 
in the foreseeable. The possible would exist as actual in 
the mind of the divine planner. But again this is the view 
Bergson denies. Either there is novelty or there is mech-
anism. At best, finalism is a kind of protracted mechanism. 
Again all is known to start with, but the period in which 
1. CE, 39. 
2. Stewart, CEBP, 45. 
3. CE, 39. 
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the process is worked out is merely extended. Mechanism 
with intention would be a compressed finalism. But in 
both cases "if there is nothing unforeseen, no invention 
or creation in the universe, time is useless."1 
But Of the two views--radical mechanism and radical 
finalism--the latter is more acceptable to Bergson. The 
first represents a 11block-universe,"2 but the latter admits 
of as "many inflections as we like." 
The meChanistic philosophy is to be taken or 
left; it must be left if the least grain of 
dust, by straying from the path foreseen by 
mechanics, should show the slightest trace of 
spontaneity.3 
But Bergson is of the opinion that the doctrine of final 
causes "will never definitively be refuted. 114 If one recog-
nizes intelligible sequence in the universe, and yet rejects 
mechanism, then one is bound to accept some kind of finalism. 
What is important, therefore, is the kind of finalism one 
accepts. 
4. The Finalistic View of Bergson. 
The trouble with those who advocate radical finalism, 
according to Bergson, is that they place their emphasis on 
the wrong end of the process. Looking back over the evolu-
tionary process and seeing how each adaptation (in those or-
1. CE, 39· 
2. Borrowing 
3· CE, 4o. 
4. CE, 40. 
a phrase from William James. 
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ganisms that have survived) seems naturally and Chrono-
logically to follow from its more primitive predeceseor, 
it is natural to think that they are implements of a pre-
conceived plan. This way of thinking is again a prejudice 
of our intellect.1 Since people use their intellects pri-
marily to utilize their environment according to precon-
ceived ideas, it is an easy matter for the intellect to 
find an analogy between its own purposefUl activity and 
that of a life force Which seems also to reach certain 
ideal goals. These goals, it is said, must be the ful-
fillment of some preconceived plan. 
But Bergson rejects this intellectualized view of 
evolution. Such a view, as already pointed out, eliminates 
any novelty or creation from life. It also overlooks all 
the waste and failure of much of the evolutionary process. 
All those abortive and regressive adaptations and tenden-
cies of life are left unaccounted for. There is too much 
struggle, too much waste, too much trail and error, too 
much that is hit or miss about the evolution of life to be 
the fulfillment of a perfectly conceived plan. So instead 
of emphasizing the resultant ends of evolution, the origin 
should be stressed. Here Bergson starts with the idea of 
an "original impetus of life" that passes from generation 
to generation through the medium of germinal cells. No 
1. OE, 44. 
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organism is a goal or end in itself, but only a bridge to 
future organisms. 
Thus the organized world is a harmony, but it is a 
harmony left behind rather than a harmony made. This har-
mony is far from being perfect, but admits of much discord 
"because each species, each individual even, retains only 
a certain impetus from the universal vital impulsion and 
tends to use this energy in its own interest."1 It is 
this individual use of the common impetus that constitutes 
adaptation according to Bergson. 2 And since each organism 
retains something of the original impulsion, this explains 
the complementary developments of life, even in dissimilar 
situations, while still allowing for the divergent tenden-
cies of life. 
When one looks back over the road, or roads, that the 
evolution of life has taken, it certainly appears as if the 
journey were mapped out in advance. Since some of the adap-
tations are favored and continued, it appears as if life 
has taken a linear development. But in reality it is not 
knewn how many divergent tendencies, how many blind alleys, 
how many generations it took to produce a single line of 
development. And again, turning to a forward rather than 
a backward view of evolution, who would be so bold as to 
predict what new forms of life, or what new tendencies of 
l. CE, 50. 
2. See CE, 50. 
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development will be manifested in the future. That life 
will continue to evolve seems almost a necessity, but the 
direction and kind of evolvement is as unknown as the 
nature of creation itself. 
Thus the conclusion Bergson arrives at is that evolu-
tion is the result "of an original impetus of life, passing 
from one generation of germs to the following generation of 
germs through the developed organisms which bridge the in-
terval between."1 
This impetus, sustained right along the lines 
of evolution among Which it gets divided, is 
the fundamental cause of variations, at least 
of those that are regularly passed on, that ac-
cumulate and create new species.2 
Those species which have diverged from a common stock 
tend to accentuate their divergence as they progress in 
their evolution, and yet, in certain definite points, they 
may evolve identically. This is especially illustrated in 
the formation or the eye in the molluscs and vertebrates.3 
Here, along different lines of development and under dif-
ferent circumstances, there is formed the different stages 
in the progressive development of the complex organ of the 
eye. And though the difference between the stages is 
great, yet the continuity can be detected, and the function 
of light sensitivity is fundamentally the same. 
1. CE, 87. 
2. CE, 87. 
3· See CE, 88-90. 
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Vision will be found, therefore, in different 
degrees in the moat diverse animals, and it 
will appear in the same complexity of structure 
wherever1it has reached the same degree of in-tensity. 
The analysis of the comparative morphology of the eye 
also provides Bergson with a biologically empirical refuta-
tion of mechanism. The principle of mechanism is that 'the 
same causes produce the same effect,• but the formation of 
the eye in the molluscs and vertebrates illustrates that 
life may manufacture similar organs by unlike means and 
along divergent lines of evolution.2 Life does not pro-
ceed by the association and addition of elements, whether 
by "insensible variations" as the neo-Darwiniana propose, 
or by sudden "accidental variations" as the neo-Lamarckiana 
suggest. In either case 
some good genius must be appealed to ••• in order 
to preserve and accumulate these variations ••• or 
to obtain the convergence of simultaneous changes ••• 
to be assured of the c~ntinuity of direction of 
successive variations. 
How, then, is the parallel development of the same 
complex structures on independent lines of evolution to be 
explained, if not by the mere accumulation of accidental 
variations? According to Bergson, this can only be done 
by comparing the process "by Which nature constructs an eye 
to the simple act by Which we raise the hand."4 Only, he 
1. OE, 96. 
2. See CE, 54-55• 
3· CE, 68-69. 
4. CE, 94. 
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suggests, instead of imagining the hand moving in air, 
let us suppose the hand passes through something with 
more resistance, such as iron filings or sand.1 If we 
pass our hand into different piles of sand, we get the 
same imprint, not because the sand is the same, but be-
cause the impetus is the same. At whatever point we stop 
our hand, the arrangement of the sand takes an automatic 
and instantaneous pattern--the pattern being similar in 
different impulsions if the point reached is the same. 
Now if we further imagine, with Bergson, that the 
hand and arm is invisible, we are tempted to suggest 
either that the imprint is caused by forces within the 
grains of sand themselves--a mechanistic explanation--or 
by the arrangement of each individual grain of sand accor-
ding to some preconceived plan--a radically finalistic 
view. But in neither ease is this true. The arrangement 
of the grains of sand, as well as the form of the imprint, 
is due to one indivisible act, that of the impulsion of 
the hand. The arrangement of the sand is simultaneously 
coordinated with the effort of the hand. But the arrange-
ment is due to the effort, not the effort to the arrange-
ment. 
And such is the ease with vision and its organ, or 
life and its organisms. "Life is, more than anything else, 
1. See CE, 94. 
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a tendency to act on inert matter, ul and the form the.t the 
matter takes depends upon the kind of impetus life effects. 
Thus from an analysis of the structure of organisms them-
selves we cannot predict finally the nature of evolving or-
ganisms. To know this we would have to know more of the na-
ture of the original impetus--the life force itself. But 
this has so far remained the invisible hand of life--the 
force that causes cells to divide and yet to maintain a func-
tional harmony. And also the force that causes to develop 
from one single fertilized egg, the zygote, all the many dif-
ferentiated cells of the body, from an osteocyte to a pyramidal 
cell: and again, the force that causes some cells to develop 
rapidly, retarding others, while waiting for years to acti-
vate still others. We hope some day to know what this force 
is, but as yet, as Bergson suggests, it remains invisible. 
And perhaps, as Bergson further suggests, it can never be 
found in an analysis of the effect, or forms of life, but 
only in the cause itself. If life does transcend mechanism, 
then the cause will never be fully discivered in the effect--
there will be more in the effect than was previously in the 
cause. 
But whatever the final judgment on this point may be, 
three conclusions from Bergson's analysis of the evolution 
of life can be asserted: (1) that life has evolved from·a 
1. CE, 96. 
1 
common impetus; (2) that life progresses and endures in 
time; 2 (3) that life does not progress by a mechanical or 
3 planned association and division of an original impetus. 
The remaining part of this Chapter will be concerned w1 th 
how this dissociation occurs, and the results of this divi-
sion of life. 
5. The Divergent Directions of the Evolution of Life, 
In the beginning, according to Bergson, there was matter 
and there was life. 
energy; matter was 
4 fact of reality. 
, 
Life was the elan vital, the creative 
the inert, the unorganized, the resisting 
Before the potentiality of life the portals 
of the future rema1 ned wide open, though it was a future des-
tined to be filled with strug~e, pain, and conflict--but also 
conquest. The resistance of matter had to be won over by the 
vitality of life. One finds in Bergson's account of evolu-
tion all the "seriousness, the suffering, the patience, the 
labor 11of Hegel 1 s negativitat? The negative of life was matter 
but it was also the means (as the negativitat in Hegel) by 
which life was to unfold itself, 
Life began 1te conquest over matter 11 by dint of humility, 
by making itself very small and very insinuating, bending to 
physical and chemical forces,"5 and then in turn using these 
1. See OE, 87. 
2. See OE, 51. 
3, See CE, 89, 
4. We !hall call matter a 11 fact 11 
now; but in the next chapter its 
exact nature will be determined. 
5, CE, 98. 
46. 
forces to its own end. The original bent of life was not 
in any single direction, but took the form of a sheaf that 
divided and diverged as it grew. In Bergson's own vivid 
language, it proceeded like a shell, "which suddenly bursts 
into fragments, which fragments, being themselves shells, 
burst in their turn 1nto fragments destined to burst again, 
and eo on for a time incommensurably long."1 And just as 
the particular way the shell bursts depends upon the explo-
s1 ve force of the powder and the resistance of the metal, 
so the breaking up of the vital impetus depends upon two 
causes: "the resistance life meets from inert matter, and 
the explosive force--due to an unstable balance of tenden-
cies--which life bears within itself."2 
~he force of life, therefore, is due to an unstable 
balance of tendencies Which becomes divided when life en-
counters the resistance of matter. These tendencies, 
broken up and segmentalized, live on to further their own 
growth and development. Some are able to adapt to the con--
ditions of physical reality, and others die in the attempt. 
In each generation whiCh survives, there is passed on the 
inheritance of the past which is utilized in a creative re-
sponse to the present. As each J;ierson 1m interact ion w1 th 
his environment develops hie own personality, so does eaCh 
organism develop its individuality in its struggle through 
1. CE, 98. 
2. CE, 98. 
life. 
The first problem of life in its insinuation into 
matter was how to utilize the preexistent energy it found 
at its disposal. The source of this energy is the sun; 
hence the life force had to find a way of etorin~ up this 
energy in quantities that could be drawn upon at intervale. 
This was first accomplished by nitrogen-fixing organisms. 
In this primitive stage the animate forme were of extreme 
simplicity: 
they were probably tiny masses of scarcely 
differentiated protoplasm, outwardly resem-
bling the amoeba observable tuday, but pos-
sessed of the tremendous internal push that 
was to rrise them even to the highest forms 
of life. . 
These first organisms oscillated between plant and animal 
but contained the tendencies which were to send them in 
divergent directions: some to remain specialized microbes, 
some to become plants, and some to develop into animals. 
The method of procuring the carbon and nitrogen so 
vital to life seems to have facilitated the divergence 
that ultimately resulted. Along one tendency of life, the 
vegetative, the process of direct syathesis of food was em-
phasized, and since this synthetic process could be accom-
plished with nitrogen and carbon found close at hand, the 
plant could dispense with mobility and become an independ-
ent factory, fixed and self-sufficient. 
1. CE, 99. 
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On the other hand, another tendency of life seemed 
to emphasize movement rather than self-sufficiency. And 
as the power of movement was developed the original capac-
ity of direct synthesis of food was gradually lost. Thus 
the early animal forms found themselves free to move, but 
in gaining this power they were left dependent upon plants 
for their subsistence. This dependence added further im-
petus to the tendency toward mobility since the animal had 
to go in search of its food. And while the vegetable cell 
surrounded itself with a protective membrane of cellulose 
wnich further condemned it to immobility, the animal or-
ganism developed specialized cells of mobility and sensa-
tion and a nervous system to coordinate movement with sen-
sation.1 
This development within the animal of a wider range 
of movement and more specialized centers of irritability 
was also accompanied by a tendency toward greater conscious-
ness. The plant too is capable of irritability as shown by 
its turning toward the sun and by the growth of its roots 
toward areas of moisture, but this sensibility of the plant 
is unconscious rather than conscious. 2 In the animal, how-
ever, we can easily follow the growth from unconscious ir-
ritability to a more acute conscious awareness: from dif-
fuse irritability, to specialized organs of sensation and 
feel1ng.3 
1. See CE, 108. 3. See OE, 112. 
2. See CE, 111. 
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It may be said, therefore, that life has evolved 
along two main directions as manifested in the plant and 
animal. In the plant life has reached a certain degree 
of self-sufficiency, but at the cost of further develop-
ment. The animal, outdistancing the plant in its develop-
ment, depends upon the plant for its energy, but acquires 
through this dependence a greater freedom, a freedom of 
mobility. This latter development proved the most fruit-
ful for the further evolvement of life, for with each step 
toward greater freedom of choice and movement, there also 
appeared a higher degree of consciousness. Then this con-
sciousness in turn favored still freer movement and wider 
choice, and again the emergence of even more consciousness. 
But this evolvement toward further consciousness was not to 
proceed unabated. It seems that each new tendency contains 
within it both the force by which it is carried on, and the 
negative that tends to revert to a more primitive state. 
Thus there developed a further divergence in the evolution 
of life. A glance at animal evolution will disclose one 
tendency verging toward instinctive activity and another 
towards intelligent activity. But While instinctive ac-
tivity stops up consciousness and tends to revert to an 
unconscious state, in intelligent activity the progress 
toward consciousness is carried to its highest form--the 
thought of man. 
50. 
6. Instinct end Intellect. 
The relation of evolution to a theory of knowledge 
will now become more evident. Bergson is firmly convinced 
that one can understand the nature and limits of intellec-
tual knowledge and intuitive knowled~e fully, only if one 
understands the biolo~ical movement that culminated in 
these two ways of adapting to the physical world. To speak 
of the activity of thought as a means of adaptation, rather 
than as a faculty for attaining truth, is itself (or at 
least was in Bergson's day) a novel view of the theory of 
1 knowledge. But for Bergson it is absurd to try to under-
stand the nature of thought or intuition apart from the 
existential situation in Which they have originated. 
Bergson sees in instinct and intelligence, above all 
else, ''two different methods of action on inert matter •112 
The method of instinct is to incorporate inert matter 
within the or~anism itself so as to act on the physical 
world directly through its own or~anized instruments. 
Intelligence, on the other hand, makes instruments out of 
1. Cf. Blanshard, NOT, I, 51: "Thought is that activity of 
mind which aims directly at truth." This gives to our 
thought primarily a speculative function, which Bergson 
denies. In the Introduction to Matter and Memory he 
states that "we must never forget the utilitarian char-
acter of our mental i"unctions, which are essentially 
turned toward action~!" (p. xxi). 
2. CE, 136. 
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unorganized matter and then acts on the physical world 
indirectly through these instruments. Another way of 
stating this is to say that animal adaptation is 
instinctive while human adaptation is inventive. 
"Invention," Bergson says, "becomes complete when it is 
materialized in a manufactured instrument."l This is 
the ideal of intelligence: "intelligence, considered in 
what seems to be its original feature, is the faculty of 
manufacturing objects, especially tools to make tools, 
and of infinitely varying the manufacture. 112 These tools, 
in the unintelligent animal, form part of the body itself, 
and corresponding to each tool there is an instinct that 
knows how to use it. Therefore, "instinct perfected is a 
faculty of using and even of constructing organized instru-
ments; intelligence perfected is the faculty of making and 
using unorganized instruments. 11 3 
But one must not make a complete separation between 
these two physical activities. As Bergson asserts, there 
is probably "no intelligence in which some traces of in-
stinct are not to be discovered, more especially no in-
stinct that is not surrounded with a fringe of intelligence .••4 
!hey are two methods of adaptive activity which are different, 
but complementary. The activity of an insect is almost com-
pletely instinctive, while there is much in the activity of 
1. CE, 138. 
2. CE, 138. 
3· CE, 140. 
4. CE, 136. 
higher animals that is classified as intelligent e.g.; 
the ability of apes and elephants occasionally to use 
artificial instruments. Instinct still forms the basis 
of the psychical activity of the vertebrates below the 
level of man: but in man, intelligence, as utilized es-
pecially in invention, seems to play the dominant role. 
So life again seems to have diverged in two directions: 
one, the instinctive, found its representatives in the 
arthropods; the other, intelligence, verged towards the 
vertebrates, and found its highest expression in man. 
There are obvious advantages and drawbacks to each 
of these modes of activity. Instinct, in having its in-
struments a part of the organism itself, combines com-
plexity of organization with simplicity of function, 
thereby achieving a highly specialized mode of adaptation. 
But the specificity gained through the Close fitting of 
the instrument with its obJect results in a loss of vari-
ability. The instrument constructed intelligently, on 
the other hand, is much more cumbrous to use, requires a 
greater complexity of function, and is, all in all, less 
efficient (compare a human hand with artificial hooks of 
amputees)~ But the advantage of the unorganized instru-
ment is that it can be molded and adopted to serve any 
purpose. Once perfected, it has a kind of "functional 
autonomy"1 thereby releasing man's attention for other 
1. Borrowing a phrase from G. w. Allport. 
things. And, as is especially evident today, for every 
need an invention satisfies, it creates many more. Thus 
the use of tools made from unorganized matter results in 
a wider and wider range of creative activity, While the 
tools of organized animals limit them to a somewhat closed 
circle of response. 
This range of activity is also important in relation 
to the evolving of consciousness. The close connection 
between the organized instrument and its object in instinc-
tive activity allows for little play of consciousness. In 
this kind of activity "representation is stopped up by 
action. 111 "For, where the implement to be used is organ-
ized by nature, the material furnished by nature, and the 
result to be obtained willed by nature, there is little 
left to choice."2 But where there is selection of material, 
possibilities of different kinds of tools to be made, in-
creasing demands to be met, the range of choice is exceed-
ingly great. And it is the arithmetical difference between 
"potential and .real activity," or instinctive activity and 
conscious selection, which, for Bergson, defines the actual 
consciousness of a living being. 
This concept of consciousness is rather unique, and 
very important in the thought of Bergson. Bergson con-
ceives of consciousness "as the light that plays around 
1. CE, 144. 
2. CE, 145. 
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the zone of possible actions or real potentiality, 111 Which 
is gradually diminished as the choice is made and the act 
completed. Possibility of choice initiates consciousness, 
but where the action performed is the only one possible, 
oonseiousness is reduced to almost nothing. And there 
seems to be much empirical evidence for this view. For 
when one is confronted with a possibility of several al-
ternatives, the whole situation is represented in much of 
its variety, complexity, relations, potentialities, and 
consequences. But when once a selection or choice is made, 
and procedure determined, the scope or area of attention 
is greatly diminished. And as soon as one begins to act 
it is reduced even further, until, in the act itself, con-
sciousness is reduced to almost nothing. There are few 
actions one has to think about in order to perform. In 
fact, it is only when the action is new that conscious 
control is usually necessary. Once learned, the act 
seems to go on unconsciously or, as Bergson would say, 
instinetively;e.g., walking, tying a shoelace, putting on 
a coat, opening a door, etc. There are even some eases 
in which conscious attention is a detriment, interrupting 
the established habit or action pattern. 
When an act is performed we do not seem to be aware 
of any diminished state of consciousness because our 
minds turn to other things to think about instead. When 
1. CE, 144. 
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walking, our mind wanders freely, not bound to the tem-
poral or spatial events of our body. And isn't it true 
that our consciousness is occupied to a far greater ex-
tent with what is potential rather than actual. Our con-
sciousness seems to precede or introduce many physical 
events, shaping potentiality into actuality. We oould 
not act unless some possibility were made definite. A 
similar view of oonsciousness is held by Whitehead. He 
defines consciousness as the "feeling of contrast" between 
"theory" and 11 fact, 111 or "potentiality" and "actuality."2 
According to Whitehead consciousness involves a proposition, 
the "logical subjects" of 11h.ich are "actual entities," and 
the predicates "eternal objects," representing the potenti-
ality of events.3 And, according to Bergson, the possi-
bility of making a choice is 11h.at initiates consciousness, 
while act! vUy negates it. 
For consciousness oorresponds exactly to the 
living being's power of choice; it is co-
extensive with the fringe of possible action 
that surrounds the real action: consciousness 4 is synonymous with invention and with freedom. 
Therefore, intelligence, which involves a selection 
of materials, an imaginative construction of tools, and 
free use of such tools, requires a much greater degree 
of conscious awareness than instinctive activity. In-
telli~ence tends toward consciousness, and instinct toward 
1. See Whitehead, PR, 245. 
2. See Whitehead, PR, 407. 
3· See Whitehead, PR, 
394-4o7. 
4. CE, 263-264. 
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unconscious activity. 
In short, While instinct and intelligence 
both involve knowledge, the knowledge is 
rather acted and unconscious in the case of 
instinct, though! and conscious in the case 
of intelligence. 
There is implied, therefore, two kinds of knowledge 
in instinct and intelligence. If, as Bergson suggests, 
there is such a close tie between the organized instru-
ment and its object in instinctive action, then instinct 
must involve innate knowledge of the object to which the 
instrument is applied. "Instinct is therefore innate 
knowledge of a thing."2 But intelligence requires not so 
much the innate knowledge of a thing as the capacity to 
organize artificial instruments and relate them to chang-
ing situations. "What is innate in intelli~ence, there-
fore, is the tendency to establish relations. 11 3 The in-
sect, from the moment it begins to live, seems to have an 
innate knowledge of its life cycle and the exact object 
on Which it must act to complete this cycle.4 The human 
infant, however, does not possess innate knowledge of 
things, but the capacity of forming relations between 
things. The new-born baby knows neither definite objects 
nor the properties of objects, yet it does possess the in-
nate capacity to recognize the connection of attributes 
1. CE, 145. 
2. CE, 150. 
3· CE, 151. 
4. See CE, 146-147. 
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with obJects. The general relation expressed by verbs 
is another natural endowment of human intelligence. 
Both thought and language depend upon this innate ca-
pacity of forming relations. 
And an even more precise statement of the differ-
ence between instinctive and intelligent knowledge is 
that intelligence, in so far as it is innate, is the 
knowledge of form, while instinct implies the knowledge 
of matter.1 Instinctive knowledge has the advantage of 
w 
being intimate and complete; but formal kn~ledge, just 
because it is contentless, may be filled with any number 
of things. Instinct, therefore, gives a complete but 
restricted knowledge, while intelligence only pxovides 
us with the outline of an obJect, but an outline which 
is intensive in its scope. 
Thus instinct is applied to organized matter, and 
intelligence to unorganized matter. Instinct involves 
innate knowledge of matter, while intelligence involves 
an innate knowledge of form. These two modes of activ-
ity are a result of both the divergent tendency inherent 
within consciousness itself, and the demands and adapta-
tion of the organism to ita environment. 
1. See CE, 149. 
conventional 
experience). 
(Here form and matter are used in the 
sense of the two ingredients of perceptual 
58. 
7• The Function of Intelligence. 
But Bergson is not content, like most philosophers, 
with saying that the intellect has an innate capacity 
for establishing relatione, or that it has an innate 
knowledge of form. Bergson seeks the reason why our in-
tellects have just this function and no other. Either 
we find such a reason, he believes, or we are "reduced 
to taking the general frames of the understanding for 
something absolute, irreducible and inexplicable. 111 We 
then consider the 11 form of the understanding as fallen 
from heaven", as "each of us is born with his face." 
The most common answer given to skirt the question 
of why is to say, with Kant, that the function of the in-
tellect is essentially unification: "that the common ob-
ject of all its operations is to introduce a certain unity 
into the diversity of phenomena. 112 But Bergson objects to 
this because unification is a vague term and it may even 
be asked if the function of the intellect is not to divide 
even more than to unite. But a stronger objection still 
is that if the function of the intellect is to unify, 
simply because it has the need of unifying, then the whole 
of our knowledge becomes relative to this arbitrary need. 
For an intellect that were formed differently, knowledge 
1. CE, 152. 
2. CE, 152. 
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itself would be different. Thus a principle is needed 
by which the function of the intellect can be explained, 
not arbitrarily, but according to some purpose. This 
principle Bergson finds in the needs of action. "Postu- · 
late action," Bergson asserts, 11and the very form of the 
intellect can be deduced from it. 111 This form is then 
neither "irreducible" nor "inexplicable." Rather than 
knowledge being made relative to the absolute function 
of the intellect, the intellect is made relative to the 
needs of action. Thus "knowledge ceases to be a product 
of the intellect and becomes, in a certain sense, part 
and parcel of reality. 112 
But what is this reality that the intellect becomes 
a part of? It has alreadv been found that intelligent 
action is directed toward :1nert matter. One may conclude, 
therefore, that "our intelligence, as it leaves the hands 
of nature, has for its chief object the unorganized solid. 11 3 
It was also found that the unorganized solid differs 
from the organized instrument in that it is not formed by 
the organism or instinct itself. The formation of this 
tool is the aim of intelligence;i.e., the first aim of the 
4 intellect is fabrication or construction. And since in-
telligence involves innate knowledge of form, this fabrica-
tion must consist of "carving out the form of an object in 
l• CE, 152• 
2. CE, 153• 
3• CE, 153• 
4. CE, 153. (See) 
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matter,"1 In this process of fabrication the intellect 
never regards the form of things as final, but as if they 
could be cut out of matter at will. Hence, there arises 
our idea of matter as a kind of substratum (Aristotle, 
Locke, etc.,) receptacle (Plato,) or continuum (Leibniz 0 . 
Whitehead, etc.) for the reception of form. But this 
idea is merely a prejudice of the intellect. "The in-
tellect is characterized by the unlimited power of de-
composing according to any law and of recomposing into 
any system. n2 
The function of the intellect, therefore, is to 1m-
part form to i~nert matter. Now what is the most general 
property of solids and the material world? It is the 
property of being extended. The whole physical world 
presents to us objects existing apart from other objects, 
and parts external to other parts. In short, it is a 
world of discontinuous units. And since the intellect 
is most at home in this world, it is capable of forming 
a clear idea of the discontinuous alone,3 
However, there is more in the discontinuous than 
mere spatial separation; along with the spatial separa-
tion there is temporal discontinuity (if time is con-
ceived as an integral part of movement). The intellect 
finds itself at home not merely with the spatially dis-
1. CE, 155, 
2o CE, 157• 
3• See CE, 154, 
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continuous, but also with the immobile and the static. 
11 If the intellect were meant for pure theorizing", ac-
cording to Bergson, "it would take its place within 
movement, for movement is reality itself, and immobility 
is always only apparent or relative. 111 On this view, 
however, the intellect is not meant for pure theorizing, 
but has primarily a practical function. As such, as 
stated in the previous Chapter, it tends to freeze and 
chop-up whatever is flowing in reality. Of the continu-
ous, and of movement, it only ,;ives us a partial repre-
sentation, but a representation that is much more applic-
able to social life. 
But so far Bergson has merely explained the nature 
of representation. Postulate action or fabrication as 
the primary aim of intelligence, and the representation 
of the world as composed of discontinuous static objects 
can be understood. But there is more to intelligence 
than representation. Our reflective thought, the most 
refined function of intelligence, is characterized by 
its freedom from direct representation or perception. 
Reflective thought is considered most effective when it 
can substitute a symbol for an object and thus dispense 
with 11 picture thinking." If Bergson's view of the in-
tellect is to be considered adequate, then he must ac-
count for this severance of thought from representation 
1. CE, 153• 
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which makes possible imageless, conceptual, reflection--
and also self consciousness. 
And this is just what Bergson believes his theory 
can do. The key to his theory is language which he be-
lieves to be at the basis of thought itself. 
For the moment, therefore, let us consider man, 
not as an isolated being, but as one who lives in society. 
Now, says Bergson, 11 it is difficult to imagine a society 
whose members do not communicate by signs."1 "By language 
community of action is made possible. 11 2 This is true, he 
believes, as much for the insect society as it is for the 
human. But the requirements of the two societies are 
quite different. Since, as was found earlier, insect ac-
tivity is primarily instinctive, and since instinctive 
activity involves . taate knowledge or the thing to be 
acted upon, the communication or insects must be limited 
to definite objects--the signs of this language must be 
adherent to the thing signified. 
But in human society fabrication and action are of 
variable form, and therefore require a language which is 
also quite variable. This requires a language whose 
signs, though not themselves infinite, can be extended 
to an infinite number or things. "This tendency of the 
sign to transfer itself from one object to another is 
1• CE, 157· 
2. CE, 157• 
characteristic of human language: anything can desig-
1 
nate anything." Thus "the instinctive sign is ad-
herent," while "the intelli5ent sign is mobile." 2 
Now, according to Bergson, this mobility of words 
not only makes it possible to extend them from one 
thing to another, but from things to ideas. He does 
say "that an intelligence which reflects is one that 
originally had a surplus of energy to spend, over and 
above practically useful efforts," but "without language, 
intelligence would probably have remained riveted to the 
material objects which it is interested in considering."' 
The word, made to pass from one thing to 
another, is, in fact, by nature transferable 
and free. It can therefore be extended, not 
only from one perceived thing to another, but 
even from a perceived thing to a recollection 
of that thing, from the precise recollection 
to a more fleeting image, and finally from an 
image fleeting, though still pictured, to the 
picturing of the act by which the image is 
pictured, that is to say, to the idea. Thus 
is revealed to the intelligence, hitherto al-
ways turned outwards, a whole internal world--
the spectacle of its own workings. It required 
only this4opportunity, at length offered by language. 
Thus there was latent in intelligence, as in the 
other tendencies, a function which needed only to be 
freed, to be eXPressed or utilized. This function was 
reflection or abstract thought, and the means of freeing 
1. CE, 158. 
2. CE, 158. 
3. CE, 159 (Italics mine.) 
4. CE, 159. 
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this thought was language. It is the word, flirting 
with man's intelligence, that caused the divorce of 
thought and thing. Thus began the most significant 
triangle of history: the referent, the reference, and 
1 
the referend. The word, originally standing for the 
thing, then came to mean the thing not here, the thing 
not now, the thing not yet; until finally, it stood for 
no thing at all, but an idea of a thing. Then thought, 
released from its external obligation, turned in upon 
itself, and attempted to introspect its own being. In 
this operation it applied the same forms to the under-
standing of the self as it did to the outer, solid, 
static, extended world. Thus it sought a substratum 
for consciousness as it had postulated a substratum for 
objects. And since the forms of the intellect were made 
for cutting out of reality the patterns of things, so 
these forma made of conscious duration a series of dis-
crete states. Therefore, intelligence, made for action, 
over-steps its bounds when it tries to comprehend con-
sciousness or life. It can deal perfectly2 with the 
world of representation--the material world--, but the 
world of living, flowing, creative reality it does not 
reach at all. The intellect, made for action on inert 
1. Object, meaning, knower. 
2. This will be discussed more fully in the next 
chapter. 
matter, is only bewildered when confronted with the 
creative evolution which is life. In short, "the in-
tellect is characterized by a natural inability to 
comprehend life • "1 
8. The Function of Intuition. 
But though the intellect is thus limited, intuition 
is not: "it is to the very inwardness of life that intui-
!!2n leads ue." 2 And by intuition Bergson means 
instinct that has become disinterested, 
self-conscious, capable of reflecting 
upon its object and of enlarging it in-
definitely.3 
There is some ambiguity in this definition of intui-
tion, but what Bergson apparently means is this. When he 
says that intuition is instinct "become disinterested," 
"capable of reflecting upon its object," this sounds very 
intellectualistic. But it must be remembered that intui-
tion, for Bergson, is midway between instinct and intel-
ligence, and represents a kind of synthesis of the two. 
It contains the more favorable qualities of each. Thus 
intuition, as he says, is instinct become disinterested 
and reflective. And this instinct, it was found, is a 
continuation of the function by which life or~anizes 
matter into organic instruments or tools. 
1. CE, 165. 
2. CE, 176. 
3. CE, 176. 
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When the little chick is breaking its shells 
with a peck of its beak, it is acting by in-
stinct, and yet does but carry on the move-
ment fbich has borne it through embryonic 
life. 
Thus instinct, as a channelizing and focusing of the 
life force on particular objects, remains self-contained 
and unconscious. In fact, it stops up consciousness by 
the very precision of its function. It proceeds as if it 
remembered the whole past history of the species, and 
then acted reflexively on the strength of this knowledge. 2 
This is why intelligence was needed to achieve a reflective 
conscious intuition. 
In the other extreme, intelligence externalizes itself 
in the process of adapting to, and acting on, the material 
world. Bergson says that intelligence is, "before anything 
else, the faculty of relating one point of space to another, 
one material object to another."3 Thus intelligence is at 
home amon~ things, but remains completely external to them. 
Instinct, on the other hand, in the very fact of its or-
ganization and function has an internal grasp of things, 
especially life itself: "for--we cannot too often repeat--
intelligence and instinct are turned in opposite directions, 
the former toward inert matter, the latter toward life."4 
Now intuition falls in between these two extremes. It 
1. CE, 165. 
2. See CE, 167. 
3· CE, 175· 
4. CE, 176. 
is closest to instinct, but differs from it, in that it 
is more detached and aware. It is not, like instinct, a 
continuation of the vital process, as much as an exten-
sion of it--it does not contain its object but must, like 
intelligence, reach out for it. But unlike intelligence, 
it does not remain external to what it grasps--whether an 
object or the life force itself--rather, it knows this ob-
ject intimately and sympathetically. It can best be rep-
1 
resented, perhaps, in aesthetic experience, in which the 
subject and the object of the experience are, at the start, 
externally related. But in the process of achieving an 
aesthetic experience, the externality or ego identity of 
the appreciator is ~radually overcome, until finally, if 
an aesthetic experience is really had, there remains but 
pure experience with a submerged subject and object pole. 
The object and subject remain ontologically distinct, but 
as far as the experience is concerned, there is no longer 
a feeling of external relatedness. Rather, the experiencer 
feels himself at one with the object; he literally feels 
himself within the object. And this is what Bergson means 
by intuition: intuition, like aesthetic insight, is an in-
ternal, sympathetic, absolute grasp of the object, in 
which all duality tends to be eliminated. It is true that 
the point of absolute identity is never completely reached 
in either experience (intuitive or aesthetic), but a pene-
1. See CE, 177• 
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trating insight into the object is achieved which can 
never be duplicated by analysis, reflection, or repre-
sentation. One emerges from an aesthetic experience 
with a feeling of richness, atonement, and heightened 
sensibility which cannot be translated fully into any 
language but the artistic. 
It is this kind of insight Which Bergson means by 
intuition. It is his purpose to lead philosophers to 
direct their intuition back to the life force itself, 
and thus experience the full force--the novelty, the 
creation, the freedom--that life contains within itself. 
This experience, once had, could not be reconstructed 
conceptually, but would give the philosopher an enduring 
insight into the true nature of reality--an insight which 
would prevent him from ever conceiving of reality as 
materialistic, mechanistic, or deterministic. This is 
the function of philosophy. 
9. Summary and Conclusion. 
In this Chapter the core of Bergson 1 s "theory of 
life" in its relation to his "theory of knowledge" has 
been presented. The Chapter began with an analysis of 
the nature of the life process, through which it.was 
found that life, like consciousness itself, or the uni-
verse as a whole, endures. And it was also found that 
this process does not occur by a mechanical or planned 
association and addition of elements--Bergson rejects 
radical mechanism and radical finalism--but by the dis-
sociation and division of an original impetus. Thus 
life evolved from a common impetus, which, Bergson sug-
gests, can bast be described as being similar to con-
sciousness itself.1 
Life began by penetrating matter, loaded, as all 
life is, with an enormous multiplicity of interwoven po-
tentialities. Matter tends to oppose and limit these 
potentialities, acting as a dam through which the current 
of life must seep its way. But slowly and gradually life 
worked its way into the cracks and crannies of matter,2 
adapting itself to the existing conditions and incorpor-
ating matter into its own organization whenever possible. 
The first two tendencies of life to be freed from 
the grip of matter were the vegetative and the animal. 
In the vegetative, lack of movement condemned conscious-
ness to a atate of torpor. But in the animal, fraedom 
of movement effected the release of consciousness to a 
greater or lesser degree. In the lesser degree activity 
remained instinctive, and consciousness was to a great 
1. This point will be fully discussed in the next chapter. 
2. The nature of matter will be discussed in the follow-
ing chapter. 
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extent shut up within the organism itself, bound to 
its own organized instruments. 
Intelligent activity, however, effected the release 
of consciousness to a greater degree. In this type of 
activity the or:ganism was able to extend its control beyond 
its own organized instruments, to the inventive construction 
of inert matter into tools and instruments. Both instinct 
and intelligence represent two methods of acting on inert 
matter; but whereas instinctive adaptation acts on the phy-
sical world directly through its own organized instruments, 
intelligence acts on the physical world indirectly, by 
means of instruments made from Unorganized matter. The 
first type of activity is more direct and efficient, but 
the second allows for a greater degree of choice and variety. 
And since Bergson finds the consciousness of a living being 
to be defined by the arithmetical difference between poten-
tial and real activity, intellectual adaptation, by defini-
tion, requires and promotes a greater degree of conscious-
ness. Thus instinct and torpor tend toward unconscious ac-
tivity and intelligence toward greater consciousness. 
Then it was found that instinct and intelligence in-
volves two kinds of knowledge. Instinct, bound to the or-
ganized object, possesses an innate knowledge of things. 
Intelligence, adept at organizing instruments and relating 
them to changing conditions, possesses an inate capac-
ity for establishing relations. Or, expressed differ-
ently, instinct involves inate knowledge of content, 
while intelligence involves inate ~nowledge of form. 
This particular form of the intellect, according to 
Bergson, can only be understood if considered in relation 
to the needs of action. Intelligent activity has as its 
first aim the fabrication of inert matter. Therefore, 
the function of the intellect is to impart form to matter. 
If action or fabrication is postulated as the primary aim 
of intelligence, then one can expalin why the world comes 
represented as being made up of discontinuous static ob-
jects. 
Turning then from intellectual representation to re-
flective thought, it was found that this transition could 
be understood in relation to the function of language. 
The referential function of language allows thought to 
substitute symbol for object, further widening the bond 
that would tie thought to particular things. Reflective 
symbolic thought exemplies the formal aspect of the in-
tellect in its highest degree. And thought thus released 
from its external obligations, turned inward upon itself, 
reconstructing the inner flow of consciousness in terms 
of the material, spatial, and temporal forms of the in-
tellect. But in this effort 1t reveals its natural in-
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ability to comprehend consciousness and life. 
And finally, it was found that the comprehension 
of life requires intuition. Whereas intelligence and 
instinct are turned in opposite directions, the former 
toward inert matter, and the latter towards life, in-
tuition falls in between. Intelligence has so extended 
its activity beyond life, that it now lacks the natural 
capacity to comprehend life. Instinct, however, is still 
too much imbedded in life to impart much knowledge of its 
source. But intuition, containing the internal and vita-
listic qualities of instinct, as well as the 11 disinter-
ested11 and "reflective" qualities of the intellect, is 
close enough to life, and still free enough to give some 
insight as to its nature. In fact, intuition takes us 
into the very inwardness of life and reality itself. To 
experience life and consciousness intuitively is to feel 
the creation, the freedom, the novelty in reality. Such 
is the task of the philosopher. 
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CHAPTER III 
INTELLECT AND MATTER 
1. Introduction. 
In the first chapter of this thesis the psycholog-
ical difference between intelligence and intuition was 
considerad, with particular stress placed on the rela-
tion of intuition to time, and of the intellect to space. 
In the second chapter the relation, so important for 
Bergson, between a theory of knowledge and evolutionary 
theory was discussed. An attempt was made to follow the 
evolution of life to discover at what points instinct, 
intuition, and intelligence emerge. It was found that 
instinct and intelligence are pointed in opposite direc-
tions--the former toward life and the latter toward 
matter. Intuition, remaining midway between the two, 
possesses some of the qualities of each. 
But for a complete understanding of the significance 
of intelligence and intuition in Bergson's philosophy one 
must go beyond the special considerations of a theory of 
knowledge to his metaphysical views. As he himself says, 
"the problem of knowledge ••• is one with the metaphysical 
problem. ttl For if the original impetus, which Bergson 
for want of a better term calls consciousness or 
1. Bergson, CE, 178. 
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supra-consciousness, has split up into instinct and in-
telligence because of the need for, and the different 
ways of applying itself to, matter, then the nature of 
matter itself becomes of importance. "The double form 
of consciousness is then due to the double form of the 
real, and a theory of knowledge must be dependent upon 
metaphysics."1 
The "double form of the real," then, will be under 
consideration in the present chapter. Matter and the 
~lan vital are the two forms of the real which consti-
tute the universe as we know it. Does this mean, there-
fore, that there is an ultimate metaphysical dualism in 
Bergson's philosophy, or do life and matter have a common 
origin? And if they do have a common origin, what would 
this origin be, and how could two such seemingly different 
entities arise from it? And finally, what is the epietemic 
relation of intellect and matter, of intuition and life, 
from a metaphysical rather than an evolutionary point of 
view? These are the questions which this chapter will at-
tempt to answer. 
2. Intellect and Matter. 
In the discussion of the self, in the first chapter, 
it was found that Bergson distinguished two aspects of the 
~. OE, 178. 
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self; i.e., the superficial spatialized aspect, and the 
deeper temporal flow. When we draw ourselves inward, 
according to Bergson, and experience the sentient flow 
of our deeper consciousness, then we are most vitally 
ourselves. We compress our whole past into the tensional 
duration of the present, cutting into the future with 
each creative act. 
The more we .. succeed in making ourselves con-
scious of our own progress in pure duration, 
the more we feel the different parts of our 
being enter into each other, and our whole 
personality concentrate in a point, or rather 
a sharp edge, pressing againft the future and 
cutting into it unceasingly. 
We pass from this deeper level to the more super-
ficial aspect of the self by way of relaxation. As soon 
as we interrupt the effort to crowd our past into the 
present, our consciousness spreads out, each state sap-
arating from the next. 
< At one the self is shattered; our past, which 
till \hen was gathered together into the in-
divisible impulsion it communicated to us, is 
broken up into a thousand recollections made 
external to one another.2 
In this way our self detends in the direction of space. 
Spatiality and duration are different tensions of our 
conscious life and we can pass from one to the other by 
way of inversion.3 
1. CE, 201. 2. CE, 201. 
3. CE, 223. (This does not mean that space is an entity 
into which consciousness spreads itself; rather it is 
a result of the "crystallization" of the sentient flow 
into distinct, separable, conscious states.1 
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Now it is this same process, according to Bergson, 
that provides the clue to the relation of consciousness 
and matter. For it is the spatial form of consciousness 
that is basic to intelligence, and since intelligence 
and matter are molded on one another, we can discover 
the genesis of matter in following the genesis of the 
intellect. 
As matter is determined by intelligence, as 
there is between them an evident agreement, 
we cannot make the ~enesis of the one with-
out making the genesis of the other. An 
identical process must have cut out matter 
and intellect, at the same timei from a 
stuff that contained them both. 
THis'~tuff" Bergson calls consciousness or supra-
consciousness, and just as duration and spatiality, or 
intuition and intellect are inversions of finite eon-
soiousness, so are matter and life inversions of the cos-
mic consciousness. Conceived from a cosmic point of view, 
"physics is simply psychics inverted. 11 2 
This explains why the mind finds extension in things. 
There is the natural tendency of the mind to relax and 
spread its contents in space, but matter furthers this 
tendency along: "matter ••• aided mind to run down its own 
incline; it gave the impulaion."3 But just as matter 
carries mind toward spatiality, so does the spatializing 
1. CE, 199. 
2. CE, 202. (This comes very close to a double ~spect 
theory, but never quite reaches it, a" :W~t'IiL become 
evident.) 
3· CE, 202. 
tendency of the mind aid in se~menting and extending 
matter. It was found in the second chapter that mind 
isolates and cuts out the form of things in matter. 
And it is these isolated forms which appear extended. 
But when attention is diverted, the projected figures 
seem to merge into the background from whence they arose. 
Remove our stereoscopic vision of thin~s and the depth 
and solidity of objects seem to vanish. 
Perspective provides plenty of instances. 
We all know that stereoscopic vision is 
possible within a relatively narrow range. 
Outside this range there is what is called 
Collapse of Planes, and objects undergo 
various sorts of 'distortion•. Thus a 
hillside which is full of protuberances, 
and slopes upwards at quite a gentle 
angle, will appear flat and verticil, 
like a scene painted on cardboard. 
And the more the scope of our vision is enlarged, the 
less we perceive distinct objects. It is true our vision 
remains spatial, but the extension of individual things 
is less apparent. This indicates, for Bergson, that the 
solidity of matter is a relative thing, just as the spa-
tiality of consciousness is relative. 
What else can this mean but that matter ex-
tends itself in space without being absolute-
ly extended therein, and that in regarding 
matter as decomposable into isolated systems 
••• in conferring on matter the properties of 
pure apace, we are transporting ourselves to 
the terminal point of the movement of which 
matter simply indicates the directions?2 
1. Price, PER, 28. 2. CE, 203. 
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Thus we find that matter and intellect determine 
the form of one another, or rather, that matter does not 
completely determine the form of the intellect, nor does 
the inte. !.lect completely impose its form on matter, but 
that intellect and matter have progressively adapted 
themselves to each other iii order to attain a common 
form. 1 
The adaptation has, moreover, been brought about 
quite naturally, because it is the aame inver-
sion of the same movement which creates at once 
the intellectuality of mind aad the materiality 
of things.2 
3. Bergson's Criticism of Kant. 
This conclusion contains Bergson's answer to Kant. 
Kant conceived of space as a form of intuition through 
which the "sensuous manifold" must pass to become con-
scious experience at all,3 aut in the process of being 
organized or bathed in an atmosphere of spatiality, the 
original identity of:tha causes of the sensuous manifold 
is lost. Thus space (and also time and the categories) 
separates conscious experience from the reality of 
"things-in-themselvas." But Bergson criticizes this 
view because Kant can give no reason why the mind should 
1. See CE, 206. (It is not clear whether Bergson means to 
give to matter an ontological status, or whether it is 
merely a formr like space, of unconsciousness. See 
next chapter. J 
2, CE, 206. 3. See Kant, CPR, Ai4, B39. 
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take on just this form and no other. 
With Kant, space is given as a ready-made 
form of our perceptive faculty--a veritable 
deus ex machina, of which we see neither how 
1t arises, nor why ft is what it is rather 
than anything else. 
And "things-in-themselves" are also given, of 
which Kant claims we can have no knowledge. But Ber~son 
asks, 11 by what right, then, can he affirm their existen::e, 
even as 'problematic'?"2 "And if the unknowable reality 
projects into our perceptive faculty a 'sensuous manifold' 
capable of fitting into it exactly, is it not, by that 
very fact, in part known?"3 
These are, of course, standard criticisms of Kant and 
ones which Bergson believes his theory has answered. For 
if, as Bergson suggests, intellect and matter are inver-
sions of the same movement, and have progressively adapted 
themselves to each other in order to attain a common form, 
then we can understand why intellect can know matter. On 
this view there is no spatial form separating an unknow-
able reality from a knowing mind, but rather, space is the 
form which both matter and mind take on as an inversion of 
the same vital process. Mind can know matter because both 
have attained the same form in adapting to one another. 
There is, of course, on Bergson's view an aspect or pole 
of reality which the intellect cannot know, a reality to 
1. CE, 205. 3• CE, 205. 
2. CE, 205 
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be reached by intuition. But this reality does not 
lie hidden behind the physical world--it is rather an 
1 inversion of the physical world, as intuition is an 
inversion of intelligence. 
Bergson, however, not only believes hie theory can 
transcend Kant's metaphysical scepticism, but that it 
can also answer the main question of the 110ritique." 
As Kant stated it, "the proper problem of pure reason 
is contained in the question: How are a priori synthetic 
judgments possible?•2 More generally, he was concerned 
with how pure mathematics, pure natural science, and 
metaphysics is poesible.3 
The "shining example" of a priori knowledge accor-
ding to Kant, was mathematics, especially geometry.4 
His discussion as to how mathematical or geometrical 
truths are possible a priori is too well known to need 
elaboration here. If space, as a form of intuition, is 
logically prior to any actual experience, then we can 
understand how universal and necessary geometrical know-
ledge is possible. Our intellects discover in matter 
the geometrical order which our intuitions have already 
deposed there. And epistemologically, Bergson is not 
in fundamental disagreement with this conclusion (though 
1. This will be enlarged upon later on. 3. See Kant,PRO, 27. 
2· Kant, CPR, Bl9. 4. See Kant,o~, A4, 
B8. 
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he believes, as Kant does not, that space is also a 
form of matter Which, rather ambiguously, is also a 
form of the mind). He says that "prior to the science 
or geometry, there is a natural geometry Whose clear-
ness and evidence surpass the clearness and evidence of 
other deductions."1 And also, that there is "a latent 
geometry immanent in our idea of space, which is the 
main spring of our intellect and the cause of its work-
ing."2 
However, Bergson criticizes Kant because he believes 
that Kant can give no reason why the mind shoUld take on 
just the particular form it does. 11 It is not enough to 
determine by careful analysis, the categories or thought; 
one must engender them."3 
As regards space, we must, by an effort of 
mind sui generis, follow the progression or 
rather the regression of the extra-spatial 
degrading itself into spatiality. When we 
make ourselves self-conscious in the highest 
possible degree and then let ourselves fall 
back little by little, we get the feeling of 
extension: we have an extension of the self 
into recollections that are fixed and exter-
nal to one another, in place or the tension 
it possesses as an indivisible active will.4 
Thus, for Bergson, the mind engenders space in the 
process of 11detension 11 or "relaxation." When we pass 
from the inner durational aspect of our "selves, 11 to the 
1. CE, 211. 
2. CE, 211. 
3· CE, 207 (italics mine). 
4. CE, 207. 
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superficial spatial aspect, we gradually pass from 
tension to extension. And there is contained in this 
form of spatiality, the geometrical order of nature 
itself. "All the operations of our intellect tend to 
geometry as to the goal where they find their perfect 
fulfillment."l And the material world, also embodying 
a spatial form and therefore a geometrical order, is 
the natural correlate of our intellects. "The intel-
lect bears within itself ••• a latent geometricism that 
is set free in the measure and proportion that the in-
tellect penetrates into the inner nature of inert 
matter." 2 
4. Deduction and Induction. 
But there is more than a latent geometry immanent 
in our idea of space. Deduction and induction, the 
other foremost accomplishments of the intellect, are 
also dependent upon the idea of space. Unfortunately, 
Bergson does not consider logical deduction, but only 
geometrical deduction. He apparently assumes that the 
former is a form of the latter. 
You cannot present ••• space to yourself with-
out introducing, in the same act, a virtual 
geometry which will, of itself, degrade it-
self into log1c.3 
1. CE, 210. 3· CE, 212. 
2. CE, 195. 
There is a sense in which the deductive relations in 
geometry are similar to the deductive relations of 
logic, in that they are both a priori, but whereas 
logic deals with relations of thought or language, 
geometry deals with spatial relations. And it is not 
at all evident that these are equivalent. 
Bergson does consider inductive logic, however. 
Induction, he says, rests on two beliefs: "that there 
are causes and effects, and that the same effects fol-
low the same causes."1 These beliefs imply that reality 
is decomposable into isolated systems which can be seg-
regated and repeated indefinitely. In fact, it consists 
in superimposing one set of conditions on another, and 
then imagining that the causes and effect are identical. 
And this superimposition, he believes, is essentially 
geometrical in nature. 
exact 
Our inductions are certain, to our eyes, in the 
degree in which we make the qualitative 
differences melt into the homogeneity of 
the spaces which subtends them, so that 
geometry is the ideal limit of our induc-
tions as well as our deductions. The 
movement at the end of which is spatiality 
lays down along its course the faculty of 
induction as well as that of geduction, in 
fact, intellectuality entire. 
1. CE, 214. 
2. CE, 216. 
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5. Materiality and the Order of Nature. 
This movement ending in spatiality is also the 
source of the order in nature, as well as the forms of 
thought. Rowever, this order for Bergson is not as ex-
tensive as the universe itself. It is relative, rather, 
to that area of nature which the intellect selects to 
consider. It was mentioned in the second chapter that 
the universe taken as a whole is, on Bergson's view, an 
enduring process. But from this process we can select, 
and thereby isolate, units which a~ear to be self-suf-
ficient, static, and mechanistically determined. This 
interruption or isolation of a part of the universe 
seems, therefore, to result in a geometrical order. 
It seems to us ••• that the complexity of the 
material elements and the mathematical order 
that binds them together must arise automatically 
when within the whole i partial interruption or 
inversion is produced. 
This means that the laws of the universe, taken sep-
arately, have no objective reality: "each is the work of 
an investigator who has regarded things from a certain 
bias, isolated certain variables, and applied certain 
conventional units of measurement."2 If the mathematical 
1. CE, 217. 
2. CE, 218. (Here Bergson implies a purely conventional 
view of natural law founded on a sociological basis 
--a view similar to that of Poincare and DRrkheim.) 
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order were a positive thing, according to Bergson, 
or if there were immanent in matter laws comparable 
to our conventional way of measuring, then "the sue-
cess of our science would have in it something of the 
miraeulous."l There seems to be an order approximate-
ly mathematical immanent in matter, an order Which 
science appears to approach as it progresses, but this 
order is, according to Bergson, conventional rather 
than actual. Nature is considered to be ordered to 
the degree in which it satisfies our thought (a belief 
hard to accept when one falls down). 
One hypothesis only, therefore, remains plausible, 
namely, that the mathematical order is nothing 
positive, that it is the form toward which a cer-
tain interruption tends of itself, and the mate-
riality consists precisely in an interruption of 
this kind.2 
Thus we find that materiality and the order immanent 
in nature is not a reality in itself, just as the geomet-
tieal order was not an independent reality. Rather, the 
material order is an "interruption" and "isolation" of 
the vital order,3 just as the geometrical order was an 
inversion of the vital order. Materiality consists of 
an interruption of the tendency pressing towards spa-
tiality. But in neither ease is matter or the geomet-
rical order an independent reality. They are a SUP-
pression and substitution of the vital order. 
1. CE, 219. 
2. CE, 219 • 
3. See CE, 224. 
. -
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6. Genesis of Matter. 
What is the principle, then, that only has to let 
go its tension--to detend or relax--in order to extend 
itself spatially, and which, When interrupted, appears 
as matter? It has already been sug~ested that Bergson 
likens this principle to consciousness. But he does not 
mean "that narrowed consciousness that functions in each 
of us."1 
If our analysis is correct, it is ••• 
rather supra-consciousness, that is at the 
origin of life. Consciousness, or supra• 
eonselousness, is the name for the rocket 
whose extinguished fragments fall back as 
matter; consciousness, again, is the name 
for that which subsists of the rocket it-
self, passing through the fragme~ts and 
lighting them up into organisms. 
But just how do these fragments of matter arlee from 
the explosive force of life? To explain this Bergson re-
sorts to an analogy, as he so often does to illustrate 
his contentions. Let us, he says, 11 1mag1ne a vessel fUll 
of steam at a high pressure, and here and there in its 
sides a crack through which the steam is escaping in a 
jet."3 The steam which thus escapes is, according to 
Bergson, nearly all condensed into little drops which 
fall back, and thus represent a loss of something, an 
1. CE, 237. 
2. CE, 261. 
3. CE, 247. 
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interruption, or inversion. Each drop falling back 1m-
pedes the original jet of steam, but is carried on by 
each fresh jet. "So, from an immense reservoir of life, 
jete must be guehin~ out unceasingly, of which each, 
falling back, is a world.nl 
This, then, is Bergeon 1 e view of reality. It is a 
magn1f1c1ent dramatic vision of the nature and formation 
of the universe. From an immense source of cosmic energy 
or life there is continually thrown off the worlds and 
galaxies populating the universe. This energy when pro-
jected beyond its source seems to condense into matter. 
But there is contained along with it the spark or life of 
the original impulsion which then tries to permeate the 
matter opposing it, and carry it to further creative or-
ganization. This view is consistent with the most basic 
laws of physics--it is an extension "to the whole of our 
solar system the two most general laws of our science, 
the principle of the conservation of energy and that of 
its degradat1on."2 
The law of the degradation of energy is represented 
in the condensation of matter. The law of the conserva-
tion of energy expresses that something is preserved in 
constant quantity. But the latter principle is conven-
tionalized when applied to matter.3 It fails to take in-
1. OE, 247. 
2. OE, 241. 
3. See OE, 242. 
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to account the creativity exemplified in life and in 
our own psychic experience. 
Creativity rather than conservation is the keynote 
of reality for Bergson. The impetus of life consists 
in a need of creation. It cannot create freely because 
it is confronted with matter, the movement which is the 
interruption of its own. "But it seizes upon this matter, 
Which is necessity itself, and strives to introduce into 
it the largest possible amount of indetermination and lib-
erty.111 Physics, concentrating on matter, finds necessity 
and conservation; biology and psychology, concentrating on 
life and consciousness, find freedom and creativity. 
Consciousness is essentially free; it is free-
dom itself; but it cannot pass through matter 
without settling on it, without adapting it-
self to it: this2adaptation is what we call intellectuality. 
We experience this freedom, according to Bergson, 
when we put 11back our being into our will, and our will 
itself into the impulsion it prolongs;" then we under-
stand, we feel, "that reality is a perpetual growth, a 
creation pursued without end."3 We then feel ourselves 
a part of the "vital current itself, 11 but a current 
"loaded with matter."4 This current of life is like an 
immense wave which starting from a center, spreads out-
wards, always opposed by the descending movement of 
1. CE, 251· 
2. CE, 270 
3. CE, 239. 
4. CE, 239. 
matter. At one point only has this wave of creative 
energy, life, or supra-consciousness, penetrated the 
barrier of matter. "Everywhere but in man, conscious-
ness has come to a stand; in man alone it has kept on 
its way.•1 
Thus man alone carries the vital impulsion forward. 
On other lines of evolution there have traveled other 
tendencies, but all were constrained by the opposition 
of matter. "Everywhere except in man, consciousness has 
let itself be caught in the net whose meshes it tried to 
pass through: it has remained the captive of the mecha-
nisms it has set up." 2 But life is still an extension 
and yields to the same tremendous push. How far this 
push will carry it, no one knows. Perhaps death itself 
will not remain an inevitable obstacle.3 
<T. Bergson's Concept of Philosophy. 
Now that the real has been defined, the nature and 
purpose of philosophy can be disclosed. For though the 
reality disclosed by one's method of philosophy depends 
to a great extent upon What that method is, once the re-
ality is determined, the nature of philosophy itself can 
be determined. 
Reality for Bergson, it is now clear, is akin to 
1. CE, 226. 
2. CE, 264. 
3· See CE, 271· 
90 
consciousness. But it is, quite naturally, a conscious-
ness that transcends finite consciousness. It is a 
"supra-consciousness" and its attributes are rather di-
verse: life, creativity, freedom, vitality, tension, and 
duration on one side, and detension, matter, spatiality, 
necessity on the other. But it is also clear that matter 
and detension are an inversion of the more positive quali-
ties of reality such as creativity and duration. All are 
subsumed, however, under the concept of "supra-conscious-
ness." 
The creative force of reality is seen in the forma-
tion of nebular systems and in the biological evolution 
of living organisms. Life itself is a continuation of 
the ~lan vital of reality. The tension and duration of 
reality is expressed in the tension and duration of psy-
chic life. But there is also a detension of reality in 
the direction of space. When expended in creation, the 
supra-consciousness tends toward a spatial form. But 
this movement toward a pure homogeneous space is never 
reached; it is interrupted and thereby condenses into 
materiality. This form of extension is an inversion of 
the tension of supra-consciousness. 
Both of these tendencies or aspects of reality are 
experienced in man. His consciousness represents an in-
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finitesimal drop of the supra-consciousness, but con-
tains the same inversions. Man's intellect represents 
the detensive or spatialized aspect of the supra-con-
sciousness, while his intuition represents the tension-
al or vital aspect. Through his intellect man can know 
the material world, and by analysis, induction, deduc-
tion, and geometry he can extend his knowledge of this 
world. By his intuition he can experience the vital, 
creative,beat of reality, and therefore feel his own 
true nature. 
The physical sciences, and mathematics, are the 
sciences of the intellect. "Physics understands its 
role when it pushes matter in the direction of spatial-
1 ity," and thereby treats it mathematically. Thus sci-
ence has been most successful when investigating the 
spatial and inert qualities of matter. These same meth-
ode of science when applied to the biological, social, 
and psychological sciences, however, have been far less 
successful in achieving exact results. The exact sci-
ences are the physical sciences •• Why is there a differ-
ence in exactitude between the two kinds of sciences? 
The reason, according to Bergson, is because scientists 
have tried to apply the same techniques to the study of 
living organisms that they applied to the study of inert 
matter, not recognizing the differences between the two. 
But it is the very qualities of life--growth, reproduc-
tion, movement--which escapes the scientific formulas. 
1. CE, 208. 
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To understand life one cannot use the intellect which 
is molded on inert matter. 
To understand life and personality on Bergson's 
view, one must not dissect it with the categories of 
thought, or sterilize it with the formal analysis of 
logic. "Life is deeper than logic, 111 and also trans-
cends the intelligibility of the intellect. If one is 
to understand life--which, though an extension of mat-
ter, is still closer to the heart of reality--one must 
not use the method of the physical sciences. A new 
method is necessary. 
And though Bergson does not outline such a method 
for biology or psychology, he does describe the method 
for philosophy. And this method is th&. method of intui-
tion. The purpose of philosophy, according to Bergson, 
is not to take the facts handed down by science and re-
formulate them into a system, as if the philosopher 
coUld add to the knowledge of the empirical investigator 
anyway. 2 Rather, the purpose of philosophy is to seek 
new insights into the creative origin of life through 
his use of intuition. Such insights are impossible to 
the intellect molded on space and matter. The intellect, 
through its concepts, translates and abstracts the quali-
tative, dynamic, vital aspects of life into quant1tat.1V$, 
statio, homogeneous units. 
1. A phrase used by Borden P. Bowne. 2. See CE, 194. 
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But to seek to penetrate with them (concepts) 
into the inmost nature or things, is to apply 
to the mobility or the real a method created 
in order to give stationary points of observa-
tion on it. It is to forget that, if meta-
physics is possible, it can only be a labori-
ous, and even painful, effort to remount the 
natural slope of the work of thought, in order 
to place oneself directly, by a kind of intel-
lectual expansion, within the thing studied: 
in short, a passage from reality to conrepts 
and no longer from concepts to reality. 
Thus the purpose of philosophy is to give man an 
11 internal11 grasp of the nature of things. Our intel-
lects give us a reconstructed externalized view of re-
ality. ~atever is most vital, most living, most ere-
ative is lost in the transition from the internal grasp 
of the real to the external representation. But fortu-
nately, this is not the only method open to the mind. 
The truth is that our intelligence can fol-
low the opposite method. It can place it-
self within the mobile reality, and adopt 
its ceaselessly changing direction; in 
short, can grasp it by means of that intel-
lectual sympathy which we call intuition. 
This is extremely difficult. The mind has 
to do violence to itself, has to reverse 
the direction of the operation by which it 
habitually thinks, has perpetually to revise, 
or rather to recast, all its categories. But 
in this way it will attain to fluid concepts, 
capable of following reality in all its sinu-
osities and of adopting the very movement of 
the inward life of things. Only thus will a 
progressive philosophy be built up, freed 
from the disputes which arise between the 
various schools, and able to solve its prob-
lems naturally, because it will be released 
from the artificial expression in terms of 
which such problems are posited. To philoso-
l• ITM, 44. 
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phize, therefore, is to invert the habitual 
direction of the work of thousht.I 
Th1s inversion of thought, the accompanied grasp of 
reality, and the insights developed from 1t are what 
Bergson hoped to have accomplished in his own philos-
ophy. 
1. ITM, 50-51. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CRITICISM 
1. Summary. 
In the preceding three chapters an effort has been 
made to present, in developmental form, those aspects of 
Bergson's philosophy which are directly related to his 
theory of knowledge. Bergson believes, as do the prag-
matists and other anti-intellectualists, that the true 
nature of reality never can be grasped through static, 
abstract, intellectual concepts. This belief is based 
on the discovery (or so thought Bergson) that mathemat-
ics, long considered the ideal of rational thought, can-
not deal adequately with time or movement. This belief 
was also held by intellectualists such as Kant and Brad-
ley. Kant pointed out the various antinomies in the no-
tion of time and this led Bradley to conceive of time as 
an illusion. 
Bergson, however, as is well known by now, con-
ceives of·time itself as real, and insists that the at-
tempt by philosophers to reconstruct time intellectually 
is the source of the illusi::m. "Metaphysics, 11 he says, 
dates from the a~y when ZenQ of Elea pointed out the in-
herent contradictions of movement and change, as our in-
tellect represents them."1 If the intellectual concep-
1. Bergson, CM, 16. 
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tion of time is such, as Zeno pointed out, to render 
any movement impossible, then, Bergson concludes, 
there must be something at fault with the intellect 
itself.1 The change and motion given in immediate ex-
perience must be appreciated from the vantage point of 
immediacy alone. And since a name had to be given to 
this method of knowing, Bergson called it the intuitive 
method, since historically intuition has meant a kind 
of direct knowledge Which transcends intellectual re-
flection. As Bergson's philosophy developed, intuition 
came to mean more than just an immediate awareness of 
time and change. Or rather, as time or duration was 
made into a metaphysical ultimate, intuition came to be 
the only method by which reality could be apprehended. 
Bergson's interest in time naturally led to an 
analysis (not consistent with his preferred method of 
intuition) of the inner self, for the time obscured by 
mathematics is not the physical or conventional time of 
science, but the subjective time of aonsciousness. Here 
he says, he "found pure, unadulterated inner continuity 
(duration), continuity which was neither unity nor mul-
tiplicity, and which did not fit into any of our cate-
gories of thought." 2 It is th~ inner duration which 
1. There is another alternative, however, and that is 
that Zeno's analysis of time was false, and does not 
represent a necessary limitation of the intellect. 
,TMs alternative will be considered later. 
2. Bergson, ~ CM, 12. 
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Bergson selected as the true r~ali ty of the B·2lf. He 
was prompted in this by the feeling that free creative 
activity could not be understood conceptually, but could 
be experienced in the flow of our per: onality through 
time. 
Having discovered duration in the inner self, 
Bergson then turned to an analysis of the outer ~1orld. 
There, as in the analysis of the self, the spatial a.nd 
intellectual categories of thought at first made the 
discovery of duration extremely difficult. On closer 
inspection, however, Bergson noticed that even such 
simple p~anomena ae the dissolving of sugar in water, 
or the rusting of iron takes time. The physical world 
seems to be effected by time (though not to as great 
an extent) as the organic world is. 
But it was in the observation of organic life, or 
living things, that Bergson found a significant and ob-
vious representation of time as he had discovered it in 
the inner self. The evolution of life, as well as the 
development of each individual organism, presupposes a 
time which is continuous, cumulative, and above all--
real. And in the light of the evolutionary perspective 
this concept of real duration can be given a more con-
crete formulation. That is, duration beco:ues an essen-
tial quality of the supra-consciousness which is the 
original impetus behind the evolving of all life, as 
it is also the source of the universe as a whole. 
But the exemplification of real time was not the 
only aspect of the evolutionary process made use of by 
Bergson. The theory of evolution also provided Bergson 
with a means for interpreting the function of the in-
tellect and intuition in man. Intuition, instinct1 and 
intelligence have been evolved, according to Bergson, 
just as the other organs and abilities of man and ani-
mals have been evolved. And they can be adequately un-
derstood only in relation to the movement that has de-
posited them. 
This movement, itself a continuation of the impul-
sion of life, is also the source of matter. Matter, from 
the cosmological standpoint, represents a kind of fall-
ing back, or condensation of the dissipated 'lan vital.1 
This materialization represents an opposition to the 
evolving of life, which opposition was overcome mainly 
through adaptation. Now it is in considering the nature 
of this adaptation that Bergson claims to discover the 
method of interpretation by which the forme or cate-
gories of the intellect may be explained. The forms of 
the intellect have been determined by the necessity of 
1. The numerous problems in Bergson's conception of 
matter will be discussed a little later. 
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adapting to the physical world. Bergson is in diffi-
culty here, as we shall see later, because he also 
claims the forms of the intellect determine the form 
of matter. But this at least is clear: if we postu-
late the needs of action, on Bergson's views, then we 
can explain Why the forms of the intellect have been 
developed as they are.l The tendency towards intel-
lectualization was present even from the beginning in 
the supra-consciousness, but the particular form 
evolved has been effected by the material world on 
Which it has been impelled to act. 
Having adapted itself to matter, the intellect 
can provide man with a true knowledge of the physical 
and spatial world. By means of deduction, induction, 
and mathematics the investigation of the physical world 
has reached the high degree of precision Which it now 
has. Scientific knowledge, according to Bergson, 11 in-
volves absolute precision and complete or mounting evi-
dence."2 But Bergson was disturbed because he found 
that philosophical knowledge could give no evidence of 
such precision, and in fact, did not seem to indicate 
that it ever could. So he tried to find a philosophi-
cal method which would give at least as precise a know-
ledge as science. But even this wasn't enough. For 
1. This view too will be criticized later. 
2. CM, 10. 
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science recieves its precision from the logical 1m-
plication of its mathematical symbols, but the sym-
bols themselves are not the objects, and therefore 
represent an abstract translation of concrete things. 
What Bergson really wanted was a method that 
would give a complete or "absolute" knowledge of each 
thing in its own unique particularity. He was not as 
interested in founding a complete systematic meta-
physics as he was in providing a method whereby phi-
losophers could continue to extent their knowledge, 
in a way closed to the analytic-symbolic method of sci-
entists. The method Bergson selected was the intuitive 
method, since it way by this method that ~e had already 
discovered true duration, and the inner continuity of 
the self. 
In selecting intuition as the true philosophical 
method, Bergson also sought its origination in the 
evolutionary process, as he had also sought the forma-
tion of the intellect. In doing this Bergson first 
began with instinct. Instinctive action, according to 
Bergson, presupposes or requires an 1nate knowledge 
of the things to be acted up~n. More spec1f1c-
cally, he means tha.t the life cycle of such organisms 
as insects is not learned, but presupooses a complete 
lOl. 
and innate knowledge by the insect before the cycle 
begins.1 In short, instinctive activity is a continu-
ation of the same vital force Which caused the growing 
development of the organism and which, in its maturity, 
represents the functioning of the organs of the organ-
ism in fulfilling its destiny. Instinctive activity 
represents another tendency of the supra-consciousness, 
but a tendency doomed to failure as far as the further 
evolving of consciousness was concerned. Instinctive 
activity is stopped up by consciousness and therefore 
is unconscious activity; intelligent activity requires 
consciousness and allows for the freer expression of 
consciousness. 
Intuition, according to Bergson, cannot be pointed 
out or demonstrated 1n the evolving of organism~. But 
it is found in man, and can be explained in terms of 
instinct and intelligence, in between which, it natural-
ly falls. Intuition contains some of the characteris-
tics of both instinct and intelligence, but it falls 
closer to the former than the latter. That is, in-
stinct and intelligence are turned in opposite direc-
tions, the former toward life, and the latter toward 
matter. And intuition too is turned toward life, but 
it is not unconscious as instinct is. It has beeoms 
1. The problem of 11 innate knowledge" will be discussed 
later. 
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11 d1s interested" and "reflect! ve," and therefore cone c1ous. 
But it is not reflective in the intellectual sense. 
Bergson never tires of saying that one can pass from an 
intuitive grasp of reality to a conceptual representation 
(with some loss of richness and depth of course), but that 
one can never obtain an intuitive insight into reality 
starting with conceptualization. It is only through the 
sympathetic, aesthetic, intellectual intuition that the 
inwardness of reality can be grasped in the full richness 
of its growth, freedom, and creat.1v1ty. 
This in summary, then, is a brief recapitulation of 
Bergson's philosophy, in relation, particularly, to his 
theory of knowledge. Whatever our final critical evalua-
tion of his philosophy may be, it can certainly be said 
that Bergson has given the world an original and inspiring 
interpretation of reality. No finer tribute to his phi-
losophy could be found than that written to him by William 
James When Creative Evolution first appeared: 
Oh my Bergson, you are a magician and your 
book is a marvel, a real wonder ••• unlike 
the works of genius of ths Transcendentalist 
movement (Which are so obscurely and abom1-
nally and inaccessibly written), a pure 
classic in point of form ••• such a flavor of 
nersistent euphony, as of a rich river that 
never f»amed or ran thin, but steadily and 
firmly proceeded with its banks full to the 
brim. Then the aptness of your illustra-
tions, that never scratch or stand out at 
right angles, but invariably simplify the 
thought and help to pour it along. Oh, indeed, 
you are a ma~1e1anll 
1. Quoted from the Modern Library Edition of CE, X. 
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This praise is mainly in appreciation of Bergson's 
beautiful style, but James also goes on to predict 
that 
if your next book proves to be as great 
an advance on this one as this is on ita 
two predecessors, your name will surely 
go down as one of thf ~reat creative 
names of philosophy. 
This tribute from James came at the very peak of 
Bergson's reputation. This immense popularity was 
due to two factors primarily: the first was the 
beauty and persuasiveness of his style, and the second 
the hope he gave to those who, though tired of ration-
alism, still hoped for a spiritualistic universe which 
seemed to be denied by scientific philosophers. Berg-
son provided a substitute for rationalism and at the 
same time presented a picture of reality conforming to 
the religious and idealistic aspirations of man. This 
was sufficient to bring philosophers from the world 
over flocking to his lectures. 
And yet, one finds in the world today very few 
Bergeonians as such. What was there about th~a philos-
ophy which caused it to rise eo brilliantly (as 
Bergson's own metaphor of a rocket), and then to fall 
back, not eclipsed, but somewhat dated even before 
the death of its author? 
1. Ibid. 
This question can be answered most effectively by 
analyzing Bergson's philosophy very carefully. In doing 
this it will be found that the immense popularity gener-
ated through the vividness of his style, left among crit-
ical philosophers the impression that his metaphors, 
though entertaining, were often unenlightening and even 
tended to obscure vital issues. As Bergson's philosophy 
was studies more carefully, this was found to be true. 
Our criticism of Bergson must be selective because 
of the expansiveness of his philosophy. It will be cen-
tered primarily on Bergson's concept of the intellect and 
intuition, and on such metaphysical concepts as matter, 
space, duration, etc. But most of the criticism will be 
directed toward his theory nf knowledge. 
2. Criticism of Bergson's View of Mathematics. 
It has been mentioned several times that Bergson was 
led to a philosophical investigation of ti~e anqinner 
duration because he thought that mathematics could not 
deal effectively with continuity and duration. This also 
led him to be critical and st:aptical of the process of 
the intellect. He accepted Zeno's paradoxes as indica-
tive of a natural and eternal limitation of the intellect. 
This conclusion of Bergson has been criticized, how-
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ever, by many eminent mathematicians, Bertrand Russell 
and A. N. Whitehead in particular. Whitehead, who ac-
1 knowledges a great debt to Bergson, points out the 
source of the fallacy in Zeno's arguments: 
In his 'Achilles and the Tortoise' Zeno 
produces an invalid argument depending 
on ignorance of the theory o~ infinite 
convergent numerical series. 
Consider, for example, an act of becoming during one 
second. This act is divisible into two acts, one dur-
ing the earlier half of the second, the other during 
the latter half of the second. That which becomes dur-
ing the second half of the second presupposes that which 
became in the earlier half. But if the earlier half is 
also divided, then the latter part of this too depends 
upon the earlier part, and since, as Zeno pointed out, 
there is no logical end to the division, there can be 
no becoming. For, the first act must pass through an 
infinite series to reach even a second act. Zeno's 
paradox rests upon the assumption that an infinite se-
ries of aots of becoming can never be exhausted. But 
Whitehead denies this assumption. 
There is no need to assume that an infinite 
series of acts of becoming, with a first act, 
and each act with an immediate successor is 
inexhaustible in the process of becoming. 
Simple arithmetic assures us that the series just indicated will be exhausted in the period 
of one second. The way is then open for the 
1. Whitehead, PR, vii. 2. Whitehead, PR, 107. 
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intervention of a new act of becoming 
which lies beyond the whole series. Thus 
this paradox of Z!no is based upon a math-
ematical fallacy. 
This conclusion seems to assert that an infinite 
series requires only a finite time to be completed, 
which in fact it does. But Bergson would object that 
such an observation is not intellectually satisfying, 
since an infinite series should require an infinite 
time in Which to be completed. But Whitehead goes on 
to say that 
the conclusion is that in every act of be-
coming there is the becoming of something 
with temporal extension; but that the act 
itself is not extensive, in the sense that 
it is divisible into earlier and later acts 
of becoming which correspond to the exten-
sive divisibility of what has become.2 
And this latter is very nearly what Bergson asserted 
When he said that an act of becoming or movement (such 
as raising the arm) was indivisible. So it seems that 
an intellectual representation of movement and duration 
can be found after all. Bergson almost asserts it him-
self when he says that the "infinitesimal calculus" is 
11 the most powerful of the methods of investigation at 
the disposal of the human mind."3 
Modern mathematics is precisely an effort 
to substitute the being made for the ready 
~. to follow the generation of ma~ni­
tudes, to grasp motion no longer from with-
1. Whitehead, PR, 107 3· Bergson, ITM, 51. 
2. Ibid. 
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out and in its displayed result, but from 
within and in its tendency to change; in 
short, to adopt the mo£ile continuity of 
the outline of things. 
But Bergson still is afraid that mathematics can only 
grasp the "outline," and not the content itself. 
BertrandRussell too criticizes Zeno's paradoxes. 
According to Russell, the absurdity of Zeno's paradoxes 
is "merely due to the verbal form in which he has sta-
ted it, and vanishes as soon as we realize that motion 
implies relations, 112 For example, a friendship is made 
out of people who are friends, not out of friendship; a 
geneology 1s made out of men, but not out of geneologies. 
So a motion is made out of what is moving, 
but not out of motions. It expresses the 
fact that a thing may be in different 
places at different times, and that places 
may still be different however near to-
gether the~ may be. Bergson's argument 
against the mathematical view of motion, 
therefore, reduces itself, in the la~t 
analysis, to a mere play upon words. 
Russell also criticizes Bergson's theory of number.4 
Russell says that Bergson confuses three meanings of 
number when he says it "may be defined in general as a 
collection of units."5 The three meanings Bergson eon-
fuses, according to Russell are: 
(1) number, the general concept applicable 
to the various particular numbers; (2) the 
1. Bergson, ITM, 51. 
2. Russell, Art (1912), 340. 
3. Ibid. 
4. See pagel3of this thesis. 
5. Bergson, TFW, 75. 
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various particular numbers; (3) the various 
collections to Which thl various particular 
numbers are applicable. 
According to Russell, it is the last that is defined by 
Bergson when he says that "number is a collection of 
units," but he confuses a particular collection with the 
number of its terms, and this again with number in gen-
eral. The confusion is important, according to Russell, 
because as soon as it is perceived, 
the theory that number or particular numbers 
can be pictured in space is seen to be un-
tenable. This not only disproves Bergson's 
theory as to number, but also his more gen-
eral theory that all abstract ideas and all 
logic are derived from space; for the ab-
stract 12, the common property of all dozens 
as opposed to any particular dozen, though 
it is never present to his mind, is obvious-
ly conceivable and obvio~sly incapable of 
being pictured in space. 
This is an important criticism of Bergson, for it 
undermines Bergson's whole conception of, and evaluation 
of the intellect in terms of its predominantly spatial-
izing tendency. For Bergson the spatial form of the in-
tellect is prior to logic itself,3 the logic of language 
being derived from the deductive logic of geometry. But 
as we have already pointed out,4 it is not self-evident 
(and Bergson seems to rest his conclusion on this) at 
least, that the logical relatione of language are equiv-
alent to spatial relations, though there is no doubt a 
1. Russell, Art (1912), 335. 
2. Ibid. 
3. See Bergson, CE, 212. 
4. See page 83 of this 
thesis. 
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sim1lari ty. 
But it would seem that the laws of logic were prior to 
the laws of geometry. For, aiS Locke lop,g ago pointed our, 1 
the ability of the mind to grasp distincti~ns among its ideas 
must be a primary potentiality of the mind. The ability of 
the mind to recognize agreement and differences am~ng its 
ideas, which does n~t depend as much upon quantitative or 
spatial relations as it does upon qualitative relations, is 
the basic capacity of the understanding. On this capacity 
rests the ability of the mind to see units, and conceive of 
number at all. And this must even be a possibility of organ-
isms which do not possess intellects, if they posses, as 
Bergson suggests, innate "knowledge" of the obj;,cts on which 
they must act to complete their life cycle. This ability 
must be possessed even apart from any spatial representa-
tion at all. 
It would seem, therefore, that Bergson was wrong in 
making space the primary category of the intellect. The 
laws of thought--identity, difference, excluded,middle--
would still seem to be the most basic characteristics of 
the mind. Bergson's assertion that space is the form which 
enables the mind to make distinctions, seems to rest on a 
logical or qualitative basis, more fundamental than the 
category of space itself. 
1. Locke, SEL, 130. 
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3· Criticism of Bergson's Concept of the Intellect. 
This conclusion also has implications in regards 
to Bergson's evolutionary view of the development of 
the intellect. For if the laws of logic, rather than 
the form of space, are basic to the function of the in-
tellect, then one must explain how this function h9.s 
evolved. And it cannot be explained in terms of the 
adpatation of the intellect to matter, and vice versa. 
For, if the laws of logic are a potentiality of the 
mind, needing explicit formulation in conjunction with 
experience, then logic itself must be a latent tendency 
within the supra-consciousness. And this is what one 
would expect. It would be difficult to imagine a supra-
consciousness which did not possess as an integral part 
of its cognitive structure the laws of thought. To 
make logic a derivative of the spatializing tendency of 
the detending consciousness, would seem to make obscure 
any intelligible view of the supra-consciousness, though 
the inability of Bergson to give a careful description 
of the nature of this supra-consciousness is another 
source of confusion. One has to infer its nature from 
the tendencies and potentialities which Bergson applies 
to it. 
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A closer analysis of Bergson's functional view of 
intelligence also reveals difficulties. The nature of 
intelligence, according to Bergson, follows from its 
function, whioh is to act on matter practically. Its 
forms may be deduced from its function. According to 
Stewart, "the cogency of this argument depends upon the 
assumption that the function may be determined apart 
1 from a knowledge of form." Now, this assumption seems 
to be unwarranted. As Stewart says, "far from its being 
true that the form or intelligence may be deduced from 
its function, the function of intelligence reveals it-
self in its form. 11 2 The nature of intelligence comes 
to light in the development of its use, and in the ex-
tent to Which its use can be applied. Bergson seems to 
have made the mistake of limiting intelligence before 
finding that the intelligence is actually so limited. 
For example, much of Bergson's philosophy depends 
upon the truth of the theory of evolution. Now this 
theory, formulated by Darwin, was the result, if we can 
accept Darwin's own account, of a completely intellec-
tual, analytic, scientific mind. Darwin himself com-
plained that he had devoted himself so completely to 
the intellectual demands of science, that he could no 
longer appreciate art 1n its own form. He felt that a 
1. Stewart, OEBP, 155. 2. Ibid. 
112. 
rich part or hie life had been atrophied, so to speak. 
In one sense the example supports Bergson's con-
tention that scientific thought is not compatible with 
aesthetic insight. But this isn't a limitation or the 
intellect, eo much as a restriction of habit. A ph1lee-
opher like Whitehead, while still a great mathematician, 
never lost sight of the necessity for aesthetic and cul-
tural appreciation. In his final philosophy he attempted 
to synthesize the latest results or mathematics and the-
oretical science, with the experiences or art, ethics, 
and religion. In a mind like his, an intellectual re-
striction or decompartmentization was avoided through 
conscious intention. 
But to get back to our original illustration, Berg-
son accepted (with some reservations of course) the the-
ory of evolution as formulated by Darwin. Now this was 
a theory developed by the intellect, and yet it repre-
sented both the theory of creative advance as well as 
real duration, as accepted by Bergson himself. It is 
clear, therefore, that such a representation is not 
wholly outside the abilities of the intellect, it!!te'l~. 
That is, the extent and possibilities of intellectual 
knowledge cannot be determined in advance of the use of 
the intellect itself. Today it is increasingly appar-
ent that there is a kind of cycle through which new 
knowledge passes. First, the old truths seem self-
evident and the newly discovered knowledge seems at 
first to be a priori false on the basis of the older 
views (take, for example, Newton's views of space, 
time, and matter, and Einstein's views on these points). 
Then as the newer views receive more adherents and a 
clearer formulation they are ~radually accepted as hy-
potheses, theories, and then established laws or fact. 
When the last stage is reached, then these former "hy-
potheses" are accepted as self-evident, and the process 
begins once again with new discoveries or data. Now, 
this is a characteristic of the intellect, but not a 
stultifying one. And a period of integration and crys-
talization of views seems to be necessary if any sta-
bility is to be reached in the search for truth. 
"Fluid concepts," as Bergson called them, Which were 
too evanescent or ephemeral, would be no help to anyone, 
and there is a real danger in Bergson's theory of know-
ledge of this being true. 
There is another assumption of Bergson's view of 
the intellect which is at least questionable. Thie as-
sumption is "that the action of human beings demands 
only a mechanical or superficial view of the universe."1 
1. Stewart, CEBP, 155. 
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And this view is even more difficult when an intuitive 
and intellectual view of matter is contrasted. 
We seem to be led to the paradoxical con-
clusion that the intuitive grasp of mat-
ter is, a priori, to be preferred to the 
intellectual view of it because the form-
er is more useful, although the latter 
has been evolved the better to secure 
the insertion of the body into its en-
vironment.l 
Has the supra-consciousness made a mistake in degrading i~­
self into intelligence which misrepresents the universe in 
which we live'l 
It would seem more correct, as Bergson himself 
suggests, thet man and his intellect represent the 
highest stage in the evolutionary development so far 
reached. And if there is further evolution it must 
come on the side of the intellect rather than intui-
tion, for intuition would lead back again to instinc-
tive and unconscious activity. But intellectual ac-
tivity allows for the emergence of further conscious-
ness. Is it reasonable to suppose that the intellect 
is a favorable and unfavorable mode of adaptation, as 
well as a superior and inferior development? Bergson 
has done much to show that life and consciousness is 
the <Buse of the evolutionary development and not just 
its product; he has emphasized the need of postulating 
1. Stewart, CEBP, 160. 
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something more for the understanding of life than a 
play of merely mechanical factors. But When he makes 
the intellectual life thus developed a correlate of the 
material world, is he not leaving the principle of psy-
chic evolution altogether? As Stewart puts it: 
the spectacle of evolution, when 'empir-
ically studied,' does not'sug~est a cer-
tain conception of knowledge and also a 
certain conception of metaphysic Which 
reciprocally imply each other.• The em-
pirical study of evolution 'suggests' 
merely the necessity of interpreting the 
world from a hi«her point of view than 
the mechanical.I 
When Bergson proposes to deduce the form of intel-
ligence from its function, he has set out, therefore, 
from a too limited view of that function. It is neces-
sary to stress that an important part of the work of in-
telligence is to act on matter, but that must not ar-
bitrarily be assumed to be the sole function of the rat-
ional mind. That function in its growing completeness 
can be seen only in the actual fruits of its labors. 
But it may further be asked whether the contrast 
Which Bergson makes between instinct and intelligence 
compels us to recognize the essential limits of intel-
ligence? Bergson contends that instinctive activity 
involves innate knowledge of objects, whereas intelli-
gence involves innate knowledge of relations. Now it 
1. Stewart, CEBP, 178. 
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has since been proven that the insect is not as ac-
curate in the completion of its life cycle as Bergson 
contended. Dr. and Mrs. Peckham have shown that the 
wasp is not always unerring when it stings the larva, 
in which it la-ys its eggs, to paralyze and not kill it.1 
And in what sense the intellect is sup?osed to 
posses inate knowledge of form or relations is not 
made clear by Bergson. Bergson is not a rationalist, 
so he probably meant to content that man's intelligence 
possesses the inate capacity of thinking in terms of 
relations, which capacity is fulfilled in actual ex-
perience. But this could hardly be called possessing an 
inpate knowledge of anything. And this capacity of think-
ing in terms of relations is not necessarily opposed to 
instinctive activity, but may well indicate the source 
of the w~d3r range of intelligent activity as over in-
stinctive activity. 
4. Criticism of Bergson's View of Matter. 
Bergson has set for himself the problem of the 
genesis of matter along the lines of the genesis of 
the intellect. This genesis of the intellect Bergson 
found in the degradation of pure epirit which is ex-
1. See Russell's article, TOP, 237. 
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tn.-spatial, to spatiality. He asserts that "an inden-
tical process must have cut out matter and intellect, 
at the same time, from a stuff that contained them both. "1 
But when Bergson attemptl!l to describe this "cutting out" 
process he runs into difficulties. 
Bergson says that "matter aided mind to run down its 
own incline,"2 but that matter is simply "psychics in-
verted." Matter is what helped to determine the form of 
the intellect, and yet matter isn 1 t "real" because it is 
only an "interruption" of the vital force and represents 
a conventional isolation according to the forms of the in-
tellect. Bergson clearly tries to assert that the form 
of matter and the intellect have been mutually engendered. 
But he demands too much of each for such a solution. 
Matter must be an entity •to oppose the life force, and to 
aid the mind in developing intelligence. And yet, pushed 
to the extreme, matter would extend itself into homogene-
ous space, leaving no materiality at all. But to oppose 
life, which is metaphysical reality, Bergson 'dOUld seem 
to have to assert some metaphysical status to matter. 
And yet, life and matter are "double forms" of the supra-
consciousness. Clearly Bergson is not definite on just 
what the exact metaphysical status of matter is. As 
l. CE, 199. 
2. CE, 202. 
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J. A. Gunn states, 
Bergson finds it very difficult to account 
for the origin of Matter, and it is not 
clear from what he says why the original 
consciousness should have made Matter and 
then be obliged to fight against it in 
order to be free.l 
And Bergson's ~ivid but confusing metaphor of the 
formation of the material world as jets of steam esca-
ping from a cracked kettle, is not of much help either. 
How can consciousness, or even vital energy condense 
into matter? Why should there be any opposition within 
the supra-consciousness at all? As Stewart says, 
There seems to be no reason at all why 
this original pure creative activity 
should ever be interrupted; and even if it 
does throw out so many jets, is there any 
reason to believe that these jets should 
at once begin to 'fall'?2 
As a matter of fact, there seems to be every reason 
why they should continue their free ascent--their essen-
tial nature being free creative activity. And what pre-
cisely does Bergson mean when he says that matter is a 
movement the direction of which is opposed to that of 
life?" Does that mean that life and matter have started 
from a common point, and that, while life ascends from 
that point, matter descends from it?"3 If so, it is 
difficult to see how they should ever oppose one another 
l• Gunn, BHP, 144. 
2. Stewart, CEBP, 181. 3· Ibid. 
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--how they would get together at all. 
And finally, can one generalize from a theory of 
evolution on this one planet to a theory of cosmic evo-
lution of the universe as a whole. Because the forms 
of life here show a tendency toward instinctive and in-
tellectual behavior, does that mean these tendencies 
are the fundamental tendencies of a supra-consciousness. 
One may argue that the problem of the philosopher is to 
define the nature of reality in terms of what he finds 
in experience. But Bergson seems to lean too heavily on 
biological data alone. Perhaps that is the reason his 
philosophy seems so dated, while Hegel's philosophy of 
organic dialectic seems even today more adequate as a 
total view. 
( 
5· Criticism of. Bergson's Conception of the Self. 
Bergson's conception of the self was discussed in 
the first chapter of this thesis. It was found that 
just as Bergson opposes matter to spirit, space to dura-
tion, science to metaphysics, so he opposes one aspect 
of the self to the other. The superficial aspect of the 
self represents the spatialized, intellectualized com-
ment of the self which meets the outer world as a crust 
solidified on the surface. It is a congealed, "crytali-
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zation" of the inner sentient flow of consciousness. 
Bergson attempts to show how this static superficial 
consciousness is reached--by a relaxation or detension 
of the inner tension of the self. The inner self is 
the true reality of the self, for it represents the 
pure flow, or inner duration of the self in its be-
coming in time. 
But it may well be asked by What right Bergson 
seized upon this inner duration of the self as rep-
resenting its true reality. When most of our conscious 
life is in terms of the outer aspect (which perhaps :ts 
not as spatial or anti-temporal as Bergson would like 
to assert), it seems arbitrary to select an obscure in-
ner aspect as the true representation of the self. And 
is not the division an abstraction altogether? James 
found, in analyzing this outer consciousness, a con-
tinual flow which is quite similar to Bergson's inner 
duration. Bergson's division of the self seems to be 
due to an illegitimate abstraction resulting from an 
analysis of the self. And if one pushed the distinc-
tion between the spatial and temporal forms of the 
self, one would be hard pressed not to distinguish two 
selves rather than two aspects of one self. For 
Bergson tends to make the opposition between space 
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and time almost an insuperable one. It is true that 
this opposition is only insuperable in terms of the 
knowledge relationship, whereas the existential pas-
sage from one to the other is accounted for, Bergson 
believes, in terms of detension or inversion. But it 
seems that the difficulty could have been avoided, as 
Stewart suggests, 
by recognizing the fact that the form of 
intelligence is an abstraction, and that 
the will is likewise an abstraction. The 
concrete fact is the organic self, the 
highest type of organism Which we know. 
The will is the energizing of this rat-
ional organism, and the form of intelli-
gence expresses its fundamental modes of 
activity. 
It is because of these two d~mensions of the self 
that there is permanence and change. There 1! the con-
tinual flow or flux of consciousness, and yet there are 
more or less static states, and permanent concepts and 
universals Which allow for the permanence and stability 
necessary for life, Bergson too recognized the need 
of this permanence, but he relegated it to the needs of 
action, selecting pure heterogeneous duration as the 
true reality. But again, Bergson cannot give an ade-
quate reason for this selection. As Stewart said above, 
there is only the one organic self, with many d1men-
i1ons of activity, two of which are permanence and 
1. Stewart, CEBP, 200. 
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change, space and time, or intelligence and will. 
6. Estimate of the Intuitive Method. 
One of the most characteristic and fundamental 
elements of Bergson's philosophy is the intuitive meth-
od. It 1a a persistent occurr~nce in the history of 
philosophy that when one becomes impatient or distrust-
ful of the slow prodding method of intellectual ad-
vancement, that he turn to a method of knowing thst is 
direct and infallible. The conceptions of this method 
have been as different as that of Plato, Spinoza, and 
Bergson, and yet the motives for rejecting the intel-
lect in favor of intuition have been very nee.rly the 
same. Intellectual knowledge is obviously imperfect 
limited, and this is not the most desirable state of 
affairs. There is, however, at times of keenest con-
centration, a synthetic grasp of a wide area of knowl-
edge which gives a vision of things that is qual-
itatively different from that available previous to 
this insight. Often this insight is momentary, frag, 
mentary and fleeting, and yet one is left with the 
feeling of having penetrated further into the unknown 
in that momentary glimpse, than one could possibly re-
count in terms of discursive reflection. 
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It is this kind of "divine insight" which philos-
ophers have had in mind when they opposed intuition to 
intellect. And intuition is, undoubtedly, a precursor 
of intellectual knowledge. But does this mean th"lt it 
is opposed to it. For my part, I think it does not. 
An intuitive grasp of relations is itself the founda-
tion of intelligence. In logic one pacses through a 
series of intuitive insights to the conclusion. Until 
these insights are grasped, the meaning or significance 
is obscured. And what one has initially grasped intui-
tively and vaguely, one can later make explicit and 
clear by elaboration and reflection. Thus the process 
of attaining knowledge consists in passing from intuition 
to reflection and vice versa. These are not opposing 
methods of knowing, and there is no exclusive way to 
truth. 
Bergson's philosophy itself is the best example 
ot this. he was a master at analyzing the self, and 
such notions as time, apace, and freedom. The signif t-
cance of much of his philosoohy rests upon this anal-
ysis--and yet, h~ condemns analysis as an inferior 
method of attaining knowledge. Or rather, as a method 
capable of attaining knowledge less true than that of 
intuition. And his philosoohy too represents a sig-
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nificant use of the intellect. In An Introduction to 
M&taphysics he says 
Concepts ••• generally go together in couples 
and represent two contraries. There is 
hardly any concrete reality which cannot be 
observed from two opposing standpoints, 
which cannot consequently be subsumed under 
two antagonisticconcepts. Hence a thesis 
and an antithesis which we endeavor in vain 
to reconcile logics.lly, for the very simple 
reason that it is impossible, with concepts 
and observations taken from outside points 
of view, to make a thing. But from the ob-ject, seized by intuition, we pass easily 
in many cases to the two contrary concepts; 
and as in this way thesis and antithesis 
can be seen to spring from reality, we grasp 
at the same time how it is that the two are 
opposed and how they are reconciled.l 
One WOGld think Bergson was opposed to contrary concepts, 
and yet his philosophy abounds with them. Space and 
time, matter and the elan vital, intuition and intel-
ligence, freedom and necessity, are all conceptual op-
posites in Bergson's system. And yet he attempts to 
give a reasonable support, rather than just a mere in-
tuitive grasp of them. It is true that his metaphors 
attempt to convince apart from agrumentation, yet there 
is argumentation in Bergson's philosophy also. What is 
significant about his philosophy is that he was able to 
see the subtle shadings and vast complexity of reality, 
1. ITM, 38. 
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and that he could use the methode at hand--analysis, 
reflection, intuition--as few philosophers have ever 
been able to, in interpreting and representing reality. 
His philosophy and his method are not the last or 
final word in philosophy; and, indeed, hedid not in-
tend them to be. He hoped to formulate a philosoph-
ical method by which an ever increasing knowledge of 
reality was to be had. What he did, at least, was to 
give a vision of reality which will remain one of the 
significant contributions of philosophy. If the pur-
pose of philosophers is to provide an insight into the 
nature of reality, then Bergson has fulfilled this pur-
pose, in a very inspiring way. 
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ABSTRACT 
1. Thare is a vitalistic reality which is external and yet 
immediately given in intuition. 
2. This reality exists in its initi.al purity as a free, cre-
ative, energizing, implusive force, that Bergson calls supra-
consciousness. 
3. The expansion or creative explosiveness of this original 
impetus tends, as its psychic force is extended beyond its 
origin, to condense into matter and detend toward pure hom-
ogeneous space. 
4. The evolution of life is one manifestation of this psychic 
energy in its creative struggle against matter. 
5. A theory of knowledge must be formulated in relation to 
the creative evolving of consciousness, and also the meta-
physical antithe.sa,s representing inversions of the psychical 
tensions of the supra-consciousness. 
6. The intellect is thereby found to be one tendency of the 
supra-consciousness, a relaxation toward apatial representa-
tion, whose forms have been molded by the necessity of acting 
on inert extended matter. 
7. The analytic and deductive functions of the intellect rest 
on its spatial form, and preuent a conceptual apprehension of 
the mobility, creativity, and essential freedom of reality. 
8. Another tendency developed from the supra-consciousness 
is intuition, and by the use of intuition one can see how 
such metaphysical opposites as space and duration, matter 
and life, necessity and freedom, intelligence and intuition 
spring from reality as inversions of the supn-co.1sciousnass. 
9. However, Bergson's initial assumption that a mathematical 
account of mobility is inherently incorrect, and thereby mani-
fests a natural inability of the intellect, has been proven 
false. 
10. Bergson's narrow restriction of the function of the intel-
lect must be reinterpreted in terms of actual intellectual 
processes themselves. 
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